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INTRODUCTION
Surrogate motherhood has now been practiced in the United States and
internationally for over thirty years.1 Thousands of children have been born of
surrogate mothers worldwide and only a minute percentage wind up in litigation or
result in serious disputes.2 The process of surrogate motherhood provides many

† Copyright © 2013 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; J.D., Harvard
Law School; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University. The author would like to thank
the University of Dayton School of Law for its generous funding of this research project and
for the University of Dayton Faculty Colloquium participants for their questions, comments,
and support. I would also like to thank the participants in the 2012 “Baby Markets”
Conference at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law for their helpful and thorough
feedback. Special thanks to Richard Storrow, June Carbone, Eric Chaffee, Michele Gillman,
Judith Daar, I. Glenn Cohen, Ellen Waldman, Rhadika Rao, Lisa Ikemoto, and Jody Lyneé
Madeira for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article.
1. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 851 (2000). “The earliest
reported contemporary surrogate mother case is generally agreed to have been in 1980.” R.J.
Edelmann, Surrogacy: The Psychological Issues, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 123,
125 (2004). Of course, there are a number of Biblical instances of surrogacy as well;
although, those instances are closer to surrogate wives then surrogate motherhood. See
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire or the Essence of Motherhood? A
Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 91, 120 (2002).
2. See Natalie Gamble & Louisa Ghevaert, Surrogacy, Parenthood and Disputes: Are
There Any Lessons To Be Learned?, BIONEWS (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.bionews.org.uk/
page_89334.asp; Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women
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infertile couples with genetically related children; it is a service that is highly
valued and in demand.3 Surrogacy also allows homosexual couples to have
genetically related children and can assist a single man to start a genetic family. As
one scholar has noted, a once-maligned process is now largely accepted across the
political and feminist spectrum.4
Still, the arguments for and against commercial surrogacy have created a
whirlwind of agitation. Advocates intuitively embrace the practical solutions
surrogacy provides for couples and individuals who seek to procreate but are
inhibited by infertility or limitations of nature in the context of homosexual
couples.5 Empirical studies of commercial surrogacy have largely concluded that
surrogates and commissioning couples are satisfied and enriched by the process.6 In
addition, the narratives of success and fulfillment that abound in the media and
even in academic literature are powerful testimonies in favor of surrogacy. When
the end is relieving suffering and fulfilling longing for family and children,
utilitarian practical justifications weigh strongly in favor of surrogacy when
participants are able and willing.7 Principled theoretical justifications are also
offered to support advocates’ positions: advocates support the autonomy and power
it provides to commissioning and intended parents as well as to surrogates who
choose to engage in these arrangements for compensation.8 Advocates view the
or a Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 130
(1997) (“The cases illustrated thus far demonstrate that conflicts over custody of a child born
through surrogacy have been minimal.”); Karen Synesiou, Surrogacy: Myths and Realities,
MOTHERINGINTHEMIDDLE.COM (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.motheringinthemiddle.com/
?tag=karen-synesiou. But see, e.g., S.N. v. M.B., 188 Ohio App. 3d 324, 333, 2010-Ohio-2479,
935 N.E.2d 463, 470 (10th Dist.) (holding that Ohio’s Parentage Act applies to any parentage
determination, including surrogacy cases), cause dismissed, 126 Ohio St. 3d 1525, 2010-Ohio3583, 931 N.E.2d 126.
3. In this Article, I consider commercial surrogacy. Altruistic unpaid surrogacy is also
practiced but it is not the subject of this Article. Some countries, such as Canada and the
United Kingdom, prohibit commercial surrogacy but allow unpaid surrogacy. See Surrogacy
Arrangements Act, 1985, c. 49, § 1A (U.K.), inserted by Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 36(1) (U.K.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004,
c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.).
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 137–44 (2009).
5. See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James, More Gay Men Choose Surrogacy to Have
Children, ABC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/OnCall/
story?id=4439567&page=1.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See, e.g., Emily Gelmann, “I’m Just the Oven, It’s Totally Their Bun”: The Power
and Necessity of the Federal Government to Regulate Commercial Gestational Surrogacy
Arrangements and Protect the Legal Rights of Intended Parents, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
159 (2011) (couching the need to legalize surrogacy in the context of helping to fulfill
couples procreative desires); Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 167 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990); JOHN A.
ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
130–32 (1994); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY passim (1989)
(arguing that permitting surrogacy supports women’s autonomy over their bodies); John
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rejection of surrogacy as reactive and anti-technological because it denies important
practical benefits to people searching to fulfill procreative desires.9
In the opposing camp, many have reacted with hostility and outrage to a
contractual arrangement that commercializes women’s gestational services.10 Such
deontological arguments point to theoretical and conceptual concerns despite
practical benefits. Anti-surrogacy advocacy by feminists, social conservatives, and
others has led to the banning of the practice in a number of states in the United
States and countries worldwide.11 Such opposition is sometimes coupled with
opposition to other fertility treatments such as egg and sperm donation and in vitro
fertilization more generally, but it is also often targeted specifically at surrogate
motherhood as an outlier among other fertility treatments.12 Arguments against
Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for
Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 383 (1991); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 297, 309. There are also claims that U.S. citizens have a procreative right to use
surrogacy. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the State’s Burden of Proof
in Regulating Noncoital Reproduction, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, supra, at 24, 25–27.
But, the constitutional right to privacy in coital reproduction does not likely extend to
surrogacy. See Garrison, supra note 1, at 857; Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching
Surrogate Motherhood, 26 VT. L. REV. 407, 413–14 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); Gelmann, supra note 7, at 161 (citing Ruby L. Lee,
Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation,
20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275, 286 (2009) (describing the failure to provide regulation to
permit surrogacy as a problem of legal conservatism: the “[l]aws have not kept pace with
advancing growth in reproductive technologies.”)); London, supra note 7, at 393 (“This
discussion is intended to invite a broader dialogue within feminist jurisprudence and the
legal community and to advance the notion that the law should facilitate, rather than inhibit,
procreative advancements.”) (citing Shultz, supra note 8, at 303 (“By embracing the
emerging opportunities provided by advancing technology, the law would enhance
individual freedom, fulfillment and responsibility.”)).
10. See MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); CHRISTINE OVERALL,
HUMAN REPRODUCTION: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, POLICIES (1993); JANICE G. RAYMOND,
WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN’S
FREEDOM (1993); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989); Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate
Mother, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17 (1991) (raising racial concerns connected with the use
of surrogacy and advocating alternately for a ban on surrogate contracts or refusal to enforce
surrogate contracts); Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293,
333–34 (1998); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1928–
36 (1987); Scott, supra note 4, at 130–37 (recounting feminists and social conservatives’
objections to surrogate motherhood around the time of In re Baby M).
11. Australia, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico,
Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, and some U.S. states ban surrogacy altogether; Brazil,
Israel, and the U.K. use tight restrictions to regulate surrogacy. See, e.g., Karen Busby &
Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research
on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 13, 32–36 (2010); Laufer-Ukeles, supra
note 1, at 98–104; Amrita Pande, Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect
Mother-Worker, 35 SIGNS 969, 972 (2010).
12. See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 13 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (“Those states that
make surrogacy (e.g., paid surrogacy or baby selling) expressly illegal are Delaware, Iowa,

1226

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1223

surrogate motherhood characterize the practice as child-selling, improperly
commodifying human life,13 exploitative,14 patriarchal, and unable to be validly
contracted for under doctrines of consent.15 Others are against technology that
expands and complicates natural families.16 Mostly, the opposition is not focused
on the actual practice of surrogacy or the individual surrogates and intended
couples involved but on the overall process as being contestable on conceptual
grounds.
Thus, in an often-asymmetric manner, deontological theoretical concerns go
head-to-head with practical utilitarian benefits in a manner that creates dissociation
and tension. No matter how prescient and compelling the ethical concerns brought
forward by critics, advocates focused on the relief to suffering that surrogacy
provides are unlikely to be swayed and vice versa. How do we reconcile these
strongly contrasting positions? Is there any way to incorporate both sides of the
debate into a coherent singular vision? Can one take seriously normative concerns
while recognizing practical benefits? While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to
the surrogacy dilemma, this Article attempts to create a framework in which both
utilitarian and deontological principles are relevant.
What makes surrogate motherhood so difficult to navigate is that it is a
transaction in commercial intimacy, and it is hard to take account of commerciality
and intimacy simultaneously.17 Many commercial transactions in intimacy are
banned or highly regulated.18 In surrogacy, a service is provided for money
involving a biological, physical, and emotional relationship that develops between
the surrogate and fetus as well as with the intended parents.19 Surrogacy involves
procreation of a child and rights to motherhood, not normally commercial
subjects.20 Empirical studies support accounts of surrogacy as an intimate
relationship in which attachments and emotional relationships are formed, if not
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Utah, Washington D.C. and Wisconsin.
Surrogacy is exempt from criminal baby selling statutes in Iowa, Alabama and Washington.
Those states that ban surrogacy contracts are Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, New
Jersey, North Dakota and Tennessee.”).
13. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241, 1244–45 (N.J. 1988); Jennifer
Damelio & Kelly Sorensen, Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy, 22 BIOETHICS 269, 270
(2008); Radin, supra note 10, at 1930–36.
14. See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong with Surrogate Motherhood: An
Ethical Analysis, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, supra note 8, at 136, 141–42; CHRISTINE
OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 118, 124–26 (1987);
Janice G. Raymond, Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 1990, at 7, 11.
15. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J.
1811, 1816–1820 (1988).
16. See, e.g., PHYLLIS CHESLER, SACRED BOND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M 34 (1988).
17. By “commercial intimacy,” I refer to monetary payment for intimate services,
comparable to payments for sex, body parts, and children. See infra Part I.B.
18. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. The sale of organs is banned and
prostitution is usually illegal, as is baby-selling. See also infra note 70 and accompanying
text. See infra notes 114–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of transactions in
intimacy and when such transactions are most problematic.
19. See infra Part I.B.1.
20. See infra Part I.B.2.
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with the fetus directly than with the commissioning parents.21 As an empirical and
emotional reality, surrogates are vulnerable to the contractual control and relational
desires of the more protected and powerful commissioning parents.22 The
relational, intimate aspects of surrogacy are real and can cause real harms to
surrogates and society more broadly.23 The intimacy involved should not be
ignored for the sake of fulfilling anyone’s procreative desires. Yet, money is also
integral; without it the transaction would not occur. Money provides appropriate
and valuable compensation for the difficult work of surrogates. And the benefits of
surrogacy are real and compelling, as described above.24
The straightforward way to approach such a transaction is either to focus on the
intimacy involved in the transaction—motherhood, relationships, children, and the
potential for exploitation—or to focus on the benefits of the commerciality for
commissioning parents as well as surrogates. Depending on which perspective is
more intuitive or serves one’s purposes will determine whether surrogacy is
something shunned or embraced. If the focus is on motherhood and the transfer of
children, opposition is intuitive. If the focus is on the way in which commerciality
can solve problems of fertility and empower women, support is likely. In this
Article, I argue that a myopic focus on either the concerns of intimacy or on the
benefits of commerciality is problematic. Rather, the appropriate way to consider
surrogacy is to recognize both its commercial benefits and intimate concerns not as
a compromise position, but as a prescriptive, normative framework for regulation.
In particular, in the context of the transaction in commercial intimacy I explore,
I focus on the vulnerability of the surrogate and take seriously her right to human
dignity in the context of allowing the commercial transaction in surrogacy. The
surrogate woman, her body, and the relationships she forms with the fetus she
gestates and the commissioning couple who invites her into the most intimate parts
of their lives must be imbued with human dignity, understanding, and ethical
significance. Regulation must work to prevent the surrogate and the relationships
she forms as means to an end—the baby. Yet, the surrogacy process need not by its
essence subvert the humanity of its participants. Moreover, regulation should
respect the commercial nature of the transaction that provides a necessary (if not
primary) incentive for creating the commercial surrogate relationships and
empowers surrogate workers.25 It is my contention that regulation that
appropriately reflects the intimate and commercial aspects of the relationship can
protect the intimacy and promote the benefits of the commercial process while
empowering and protecting the surrogate worker. I argue that in transactions of
commercial intimacy such as surrogate motherhood, regulation should be
formulated that respects the benefits of the commercial transaction while taking
seriously the relational intimacy and potential exploitation involved in surrogate
motherhood.

21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.B.5.
23. See infra Part I.B.5.
24. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text for a discussion of incentives
propelling surrogates to engage in commercial transactions.
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This Article will proceed in three Parts. In the first Part, I provide a framework
for exploring the appropriate legal and ethical response to surrogate motherhood.
To do so, I first examine empirical sociological and anthropological studies that
demonstrate the complex intimate and commercial nature of these transactions.
Such studies put into stark contrast the benefits provided and satisfaction enabled
by surrogacy, the vulnerabilities and expectations of surrogates, and, practically,
the ways such surrogates can best be protected. I then rely on theories of mixed
commodification and relational autonomy to create a legal and ethical framework
for contemplating, and guidelines for assessing, how best to contend with
surrogacy. I describe the theory of mixed commodification and how it can be used
to recognize both the nonmonetizable, emotional aspects of surrogacy as well as the
more practical and beneficial financial arrangement that is undergone. I consider
how intimacy coexists with commercialization within surrogate motherhood, and I
will advocate for a regulatory framework that accounts for both the financial,
contractual aspects of the arrangements and the personal, intimate relationships.
Thus, I not only view mixed commodification as a descriptive reality but as a
normative imperative for reflecting the reality, concerns, and benefits of surrogate
contracts. I will also consider the theoretical approach of relational autonomy,
which marks autonomy as potentially compromised in any situation—autonomy is
not a yes or no condition. While surrogacy raises concerns about exploitation and
diminished autonomy, there is no imperative to prohibit surrogacy on that basis.
Rather, a regulatory approach should be used to optimize autonomy by recognizing
circumstances, conditions, and surrounding relationships.
In the second Part, under the framework of this nuanced approach, I provide
justification for a regulated system for domestic, state-based surrogate motherhood
agreements. In particular, I argue that regulation that recognizes the kin-like
emotional attachments that are built between surrogates and intentional parents by
providing the possibility of postbirth contact between surrogates and the babies
they gestate can validate and protect surrogate’s work. Moreover, regulation that
promotes autonomy through counseling, psychological evaluations, and a clear
provision of information can promote autonomous decision making. On the whole,
I believe in formulating regulation that allows surrogacy to continue to be practiced
but in a manner that appropriately reflects the commercial and intimate nature of
the transaction. And, the legal recognition of such intimacy corresponds with the
general movement in family law towards recognizing intimate care relationships
that do not necessarily correlate with traditional formal relationships.
In the third Part, I tackle the thorny problem of international surrogacy.
Domestic surrogacy is of limited relevance, particularly if it is restricted through
regulation; the new frontier in surrogacy is the hiring of foreign surrogates, and the
question of how to consider and address such arrangements is pressing. Indeed,
under precisely the same framework and based on the same normative concerns and
empirical data, international surrogacy arrangements are cause for greater
concern.26 As I will demonstrate, the manner in which domestic regulations can

26. I use the term “international surrogacy” to denote the use of foreign surrogates that
live in a different country than the commissioning couple or intended parents. Others also
use the term “transnational surrogacy.” See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Not of Woman Born:
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recognize and organize the intimate and commercial aspects of surrogacy cannot be
applied effectively in the international arena. In the context of international
surrogacy, the concerns regarding commodification and exploitation are most
pronounced and the empirical data most undermines the advisability of the process.
Most pressing, the support and regulatory framework I argue are necessary to
protect intimate relationships in domestic surrogacy are not practical or relevant in
international surrogacy. And, conditions that raise concerns about how intimate
work can exploit surrogate mothers are much more pronounced for foreign
surrogates. Thus, I argue that while recognizing the concerns of intimacy and the
benefits of commerciality can be formed into a normative framework for domestic
surrogacy, such a system cannot be readily translated overseas.
Given the more problematic nature of international surrogacy as I describe it, the
question that follows is what can be done in response. I propose that states
providing a regulatory regime for domestic surrogacy should also consider effects
of regulations on international surrogacy. Ruling out the possibility of criminalizing
or denying citizenship to children of international surrogacy, I suggest that
countries of commissioning couples attempt to disincentivize the use of
international arrangements. I outline possible administrative procedures and foreign
policy initiatives that could be put into place to encourage interested
commissioning couples to use domestic surrogates in lieu of foreign surrogates.
In sum, this Article makes three contributions to the existing literature on
surrogacy. First, I propose a mixed commodification and relational autonomy
conceptual framework for regulating commercial surrogacy as the most appropriate
reflection of the nature of the transaction. Under this framework, I argue that
commercial surrogacy should be allowed to flourish as long as the intimacy
involved is also recognized by taking relationships among the surrogate, fetus, and
commissioning couple seriously and optimizing autonomy from a contextual
perspective. Second, I propose regulatory provisions that recognize the concerns of
intimacy as well as benefits of commerciality. Third, by examining the conditions
of international surrogacy, I argue that this framework for recognizing intimacy is
not transferable to surrogate relationships with foreign surrogates. A foreign
surrogate is not just a surrogate living in a different locale; it is an entirely more
commercial, less intimate, and more problematic method of baby making.
I. FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING THE COMPLEX NATURE OF SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD
To shed light on what can and should be done to balance the benefits and
drawbacks of surrogacy, I will first describe the complex nature of surrogate
motherhood arrangements as outlined and analyzed in empirical, anthropological,
and sociological studies that capture the intimate relational and commercial aspects
of the engagement. I will then lean on notions of mixed commodification and
relational autonomy in order to provide a legal and ethical framework for
considering surrogacy. No single noncomplex principle such as autonomy,

A Scientific Fantasy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 399, 438 (2011); Barbara Stark,
Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights Law, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 369 (2012).
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exploitation, patriarchy, or procreative freedom can resolve these disputes. Rather,
nuanced perspectives should take into account the complex nature of the
transaction. I will develop these complex perspectives in this Part and then, in Parts
II and III, I will apply the frameworks developed in the context of domestic and
international surrogacy to suggest appropriate legal action.
A. Describing the Complex Surrogate Transaction: Results of Empirical,
Sociological, and Anthropological Studies
Empirical studies, which have sought to track the realities, concerns, and overall
experiences of surrogate mothers and intended parents, have coalesced around a
number of basic and important findings. Such findings should inform the way we
think about surrogate motherhood. While empirical studies have not been as
numerous as one might have predicted given the onslaught of controversy and
discussion surrounding surrogacy,27 a reasonable stockpile of empirical data has
been compiled since 1983 when surrogacy emerged as a fertility option.28 What is
striking about these empirical findings is their consistency.29
One particularly salient finding is that the vast majority of surrogate mothers do
not attest to bonding with the babies they gestate to the extent that many predicted
and was evident in the case of Baby M.30 While most surrogates assert that parting
with the baby is a difficult separation, it does not appear to be as traumatic as
expected. 31 Indeed, given the thousands of surrogacy contracts that are entered into
each year, “‘the lack of litigation is remarkable.’”32 When asked, surrogate mothers
do not generally indicate that the babies belong to them; rather, they feel they are
providing a meaningful and valuable service for the intended parents.33 While this
appears to be true for both gestational and traditional surrogates,34 it seems

27. See Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 22–24 (2005)
(reporting twenty-seven empirical studies from January 1983–December 2003).
28. See infra Part I.A.
29. See, e.g., Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 29. Of course, there are always
outliers that may not fit into the overall finding that I outline in this section. But my
generalizations in this section are based on the findings of the studies that I cite in this
Article.
30. In the case of In re Baby M, the traditional surrogate mother did not want to give the
child to the intended parents. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d. 1227, 1235–40 (N.J. 1988). See Olga
B.A. van den Akker, Psychological Trait and State Characteristics, Social Support and
Attitudes to the Surrogate Pregnancy and Baby, 22 HUM. REP. 2287, 2293–94 (2007); Eric
Blyth, “I Wanted To Be Interesting. I Wanted To Be Able to Say ‘I’ve Done Something
Interesting with My Life’”: Interviews with Surrogate Mothers in Britain, 12 J. REPROD. &
INFANT PSYCHOL. 189, 195–96 (1994); Susan Fischer & Irene Gillman, Surrogate
Motherhood: Attachment, Attitudes and Social Support, PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 1991, at 13, 16.
31. See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U.
L. REV. 345, 357 (2011).
32. Id. at 356 (citation omitted).
33. See Edelmann, supra note 1, at 130; Fischer & Gillman, supra note 30, at 17; see
also KRISTY STEVENS & EMMA DALLY, SURROGATE MOTHER: ONE WOMAN’S STORY (1985).
34. Traditional surrogates are both genetic and gestational mothers of the fetus;
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especially true for gestational surrogates who do not have a genetic connection to
the fetus.35 Gestational surrogates report to heavily emphasize genetics and
consider the baby in the womb to be someone else’s based on genetic affiliation.36
Whether or not one believes that genetic affiliation between intended parents and
the baby does or should make a significant difference in the permissibility of
surrogacy or in identifying legal motherhood, studies suggest that the lack of
genetic affiliation matters to gestational surrogates (but apparently not to traditional
surrogates)37 and facilitates the process for them.38
Instead of the close bond that researchers expected surrogates to develop with
the baby, the predicted emotional connection seems to be forming between the
surrogate mother and the commissioning couple.39 As pregnancy lasts nine months
and prenatal care can be intensive and involved, it is the long-term engagement
between surrogate and intended parents that studies indicate create emotional bonds
reflecting the very intimate nature of the agreement.40 Surrogates and intended
parents tend to experience the pregnancy and labor together and become
emotionally and intimately involved in each other’s daily lives and relationships.41
It has been described by researchers as more than just a “commonplace friendship”
gestational surrogates do not have a genetic connection to the fetus. See infra Part II.B.1
discussing the relevance of gestational surrogacy.
35. See Olga van den Akker, Genetic and Gestational Surrogate Mothers’ Experience of
Surrogacy, 21 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 145, 147 (2003) [hereinafter van den Akker,
Experience of Surrogacy] (reporting that some traditional surrogates reported some problems
relinquishing the child but most did not, and none of the gestational surrogates did).
36. See, e.g., ELLY TEMAN, BIRTHING A MOTHER: THE SURROGATE BODY AND THE
PREGNANT SELF 31–68 (2010) (describing in great detail her in depth interviews with more
than twenty-six gestational surrogates and over forty-three intended families over a period of
eight years); Hal B. Levine, Gestational Surrogacy: Nature and Culture in Kinship,
ETHNOLOGY, Summer 2003, at 173, 175.
37. See, e.g., Olga B. A. van den Akker, A Longitudinal Pre-Pregnancy to PostDelivery Comparison of Genetic and Gestational Surrogate and Intended Mothers:
Confidence and Genealogy, 26 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 277, 281
(2005) [hereinafter van den Akker, Longitudinal Comparison]; van den Akker, Experience
of Surrogacy, supra note 35, at 151 (demonstrating how a majority of gestational surrogates
but not genetic surrogates believe in the importance of a genetic link).
38. See supra note 37; see also van den Akker, Longitudinal Comparison, supra note
37, at 282 (reporting that gestational surrogates relied on lack of genetic affiliation to
facilitate process).
39. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 142–47, 205–29; Hazel Baslington, The Social
Organization of Surrogacy: Relinquishing a Baby and the Role of Payment in the
Psychological Detachment Process, 7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 57, 58, 64–67 (2002) (describing
his thesis of maternal-fetal detachment during commercial surrogacy and noting the strong
relationships developed with infertile couples using the concept of “deflection”); Melinda M.
Hohman & Christina B. Hagan, Satisfaction with Surrogate Mothering: A Relational Model,
4 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 61, 67–69, 81–82 (2001); Helena Ragoné, Chasing the Blood
Tie: Surrogate Mothers, Adoptive Mothers and Fathers, 23 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 352, 359–62
(1996).
40. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 142–47, 205–29; Baslington, supra note 39, at 66–67;
Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 67–69, 81–82; Ragoné, supra note 39, at 359–62.
41. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 142–47, 205–29; Baslington, supra note 39, at 66;
Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 67–69, 81–82; Ragoné, supra note 39, at 359–62.
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but rather a relationship deeply intertwined with the welfare of the child and based
on the intimacy of the pregnancy.42 In fact, many studies show that it is the
relationship between intended mother and surrogate that is the strongest—it is
compared to a joint mothering experience.43 Indeed, in an extreme circumstance a
surrogate expressed becoming so attached to the intended parents that they refused
payment for a second surrogacy arrangement.44 Moreover, many describe postbirth
relationships that continue between the adults, which involve but are not
necessarily focused on the baby.45 Indeed, it is this bond between the surrogate and
the intended parents that appears difficult to erase after the birth of the baby and
that may cause emotional heartache as well as logistical and legal complications.46
Surrogates attest that the relationship with intended parents is an important
aspect of the surrogacy arrangements.47 When relationships are good, many
surrogates express a high level of contentment with the process post birth.48 They
are most satisfied with the process when they develop a connection with intended
parents whom they feel appreciate their important contribution in helping them to
create a family.49 The more such feelings are returned, and the better the relations
between surrogate and intended parents, the better the surrogate tends to feel about
her experience and the lower the level of distress or exploitations she reports.
Empirical studies demonstrate that when surrogates feel that the intended parents
are distant and that the level of relationship did not meet their expectations the
surrogates are likely to express dissatisfaction with the process.50 In fact,
disappointed expectations about relationships correlate closely with surrogates’
dissatisfaction with the surrogacy process.51
The nature of this relationship with the intended parents that is experienced and
expected by many surrogates is complex and potentially long lasting. In the short
term, many surrogates contend that it is important to see the child born of the

42. Edelmann, supra note 1, at 129 (citing Blyth, supra note 30).
43. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 110–79; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at
67–69; Ragoné, supra note 39, at 359–62.
44. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 209 (describing the case of a surrogate who refused
payment for second surrogacy to express her love for the couple).
45. See id. at 221–25 (focus of relationship is with intended mother); Baslington, supra
note 39, at 66 (focus of relationship is with the couple); Edelmann, supra note 1, at 129;
Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 69–70.
46. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 221–29; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 67–69;
Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 31–32.
47. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 110–34; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at
67–69.
48. TEMAN, supra note 36, at 215–25; Baslington, supra note 39, at 65–67; Ciccarelli &
Beckman, supra note 27, at 32 (“[I]t is the quality of the relationship with the couple that
largely determines the surrogate mother’s satisfaction with her experience.”); DiFonzo &
Stern, supra note 31, at 358–59; Hohman & Hogan, supra note 39, at 67–69.
49. Baslington, supra note 39, at 66; Hohman & Hagen, supra note 39, at 67–69.
50. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–21; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at
67–69.
51. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–21; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at
67–69.
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agreement and to be acknowledged by the new family during and after the birth.52
But, overall, surrogates’ expectations appear to be that the relationship will last
well past the birth, perhaps in perpetuity. Indeed, according to relevant studies, it is
important to surrogates that these relationships that form during the pregnancy do
not terminate suddenly and drastically when the child is born and transferred to the
intended parents.53 Surprisingly, satisfaction with the process can be negatively
influenced even if the relationship was good during the pregnancy but then tapers
off after the birth.54 Most surrogate mothers, and especially the ones who are
particularly satisfied with the process, report continued relationships and contact
with the commissioning couple for years after the birth.55 Thus, it is not only the
relationship that is important to surrogates during the time of the agreement, but it
is important for them to feel an emotional connection well past that timeframe. The
surrogate wants to feel that the relationship that developed during the pregnancy
with the intended couple is real and meaningful and that it will last—that it was not
just a time-limited contract exchanging payment for services, but that a real
emotional bond developed that went beyond an exchange of money for a
pregnancy.
Many surrogates express that they want to feel appreciated and thanked for their
investment in time and effort beyond receiving payment.56 While they work for
money, many surrogates express altruistic motives as well, and no amount of
money could fully compensate women for the level of commitment they must
make.57 In describing their work, surrogate narratives use concepts of “gift-giving”
and “mission” to accentuate the more altruistic side of their endeavors and to
deemphasize the commercial contractual nature of their work.58 Evidence suggests
that surrogates want to be acknowledged for the altruistic aspects of their actions as
well as paid for the commercial aspects.
In sum, studies indicate that surrogates go through an intense emotional and
physical process for the intended parents and want their work to be acknowledged
and valued. Moreover, relationships that develop during the course of the fortyweek pregnancy with commissioning couples matter to surrogates; surrogates want
the relationships to have meaning. If surrogates do not feel appreciated and
connected to the intended parents beyond the birth, they often feel used and

52. TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–21.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., TEMAN, supra note 36, at 225–29; Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at
32.
55. Only a limited number of studies have tracked surrogate relationships with intended
parents for years after the birth, but some are available and all attest to the continued
relationships that usually develop and the satisfaction this bring surrogates. See TEMAN,
supra note 36, at 205–33; Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 32.
56. See LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS
CHANGING MEN, WOMEN, AND THE WORLD 136 (2007); TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–35.
57. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
58. Amrita Pande, Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India: Gifts for Global
Sisters?, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 618, 619 (2011); see TEMAN, supra note 36, at
205–33, passim.

1234

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1223

discarded.59 This attests to the ways that surrogacy transcends a mere job for hire.
Surrogates work for money, but many surrogates attest that the investment they
make in carrying the fetus is extremely physically and emotionally involved and
that they want the nature of this relationship appreciated and recognized. These
empirical studies are important for the picture of surrogacy they paint, which is
quite different from the concerns about exploitation and trauma than many
predicted. In particular, they demonstrate that there are indeed emotional bonds
formed during surrogacy that transcend the contractual agreement and that these
emotional bonds are between adults rather than with the fetus the surrogate carries
and the baby she births.
Another important empirical finding is that, generally, surrogate mothers, when
working for commissioning couples domestically within the United States, Europe,
and Israel, are not members of an underclass faced with poverty particularly
susceptible to exploitation but rather are generally working-class women.60 In the
United States and Europe, they are also usually Caucasian, Christian, and in their
late twenties and early thirties.61 They usually have high school and not
infrequently some college education.62 While surrogates are generally in a lower
economic class than intended parents, they are not usually in desperate positions.63
It is possible that poor, more vulnerable women are screened out by surrogacy
agencies and commissioning couples,64 but the availability of educated, financially
stable women for surrogacy is instructive. Studies also demonstrate that surrogates
often have multiple children themselves and use the money to supplement family

59. See TEMAN, supra note 36, at 205–33; DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 357–58;
Baslington, supra note 39, at 66–67.
60. TEMAN, supra note 36, at 23–24; Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 29–31;
DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 357–58.
61. See, e.g., HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART
54 (1994) (“The quantifiable data collected from [twenty-eight] formal surrogate interviews
reveal that surrogates are predominantly white, working class, of Protestant or Catholic
background; approximately 30 percent are full-time homemakers, married, with an average
of three children, high school graduates, with an average age of twenty-seven years.”);
Isadore Schmukler & Betsy P. Aigen, The Terror of Surrogate Motherhood: Fantasies,
Realities, and Viable Legislation, in GENDER IN TRANSITION: A NEW FRONTIER 235, 244
(Joan Offerman-Zuckerberg ed., 1989) (age); Baslington, supra note 39, at 61 (age);
Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 66 (age, race, and religion); Ciccarelli & Beckman,
supra note 27, at 31 (describing surrogates as “in their twenties or thirties, White, Christian,
married and have children of their own.”); Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 63; Christine
Hagan Kleinpeter & Melinda M. Hohman, Surrogate Motherhood: Personality Traits and
Satisfaction with Service Providers, 87 PSYCHOL. REP. 957, 958–59, 962–63 (2000) (age,
race, and religion); van den Akker, Experience of Surrogacy, supra note 35, at 148 (age);
van den Akker, Longitudinal Comparison, supra note 37, at 279 (age).
62. E.g., RAGONÉ, supra note 61, at 54–55; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 39, at 63, 66;
van den Akker, Experience of Surrogacy, supra note 35, at 148; van den Akker,
Longitudinal Comparison, supra note 37, at 278–79.
63. See, e.g., DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 357 (“Research shows that although
surrogates are not poor, they are usually of lower income and are less educated than the
intended parents that employ them.”).
64. See, e.g., Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 31.
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income while staying home to raise children or working part-time.65 In particular,
military wives, who move too much to hold down steady jobs but have good health
benefits, use the opportunity to surrogate in order to double their household income
while raising small children.66
Thus, feminist predictions that gestational surrogacy would lead to a situation in
which poor, uneducated women would be used and controlled in an undignified
manner have not materialized.67 This is true at least in domestic surrogacy
arrangements in the United States, Europe, and Israel, locales in which these
studies have been conducted.68 This is an important finding for determining the
level of exploitation and autonomy that may be involved. Contrary to many
predictions, there are educated women who do have other choices for earning
money and supporting themselves and their families who seem to prefer surrogacy
to other job choices and even enjoy the process. Indeed, the author has met a
physician who served as a surrogate to a younger, less educated woman to whom
she was not related. While such instances are relatively rare, the fact that they occur
is informative.
B. Mixed Commodification: Mothering for Money
The way to make sense of the tension between ethical concerns regarding
protecting vulnerability and the satisfaction expressed for the practical benefits of
commercial surrogacy is by exploring and recognizing the complex nature of the
controversial transaction, which is also a relationship. Commercial surrogacy is
both deeply intimate and a market transaction. This deep intimacy emanates from
the nature of pregnancy, its duration, and its biological impact on the baby and the
gestating woman.69 Yet, money is an essential part of the transaction, providing due
compensation for extremely hard work, relieving suffering for infertile couples,
and, for the most part, engendering satisfied partnerships between commissioning
couples and surrogate mothers. In this Part, I will first broadly outline the physical
and emotional intimacy of surrogacy reflected in the empirical studies described
above and the potential harms such intimacy creates when part of a market
transaction. The commercial aspects of paid surrogacy are clear as are benefits to
the intended parents and the monetary benefits to the surrogate. But, the intimate
aspects and the harms of commodification of such intimacy should be clarified.
Then, I will describe the theoretical perspective of mixed commodification that best
reflects and explains the complexity of surrogate motherhood. I will then move

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 357–58.
See id. at 358.
See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 237; OVERALL, supra note 14, at 124–26.
See supra Part I.A.
See ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND
INSTITUTION 64 (1976) (observing that in women’s experience, the fetus challenges the
inside-outside dualism in western philosophy by being at once introduced from without and
nascent from within, so that “[t]he child that I carry for nine months can be defined neither
as me or as not-me” (emphasis in original)); Theresa Glennon, Regulation of Reproductive
Decision-Making, in REGULATING AUTONOMY: SEX, REPRODUCTION AND FAMILY 149, 154
(Shelley Day Sclater et al. eds., 2009).
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from theory to practice, arguing for the need to regulate commercial surrogacy due
to the intimacy involved while recognizing the simultaneous need to allow
surrogacy to exist in the market to provide valuable services to commissioning
couples and valid labor choices for surrogates. Finally, I will consider some
criticisms of mixed commodification and its application to the legal context and
discuss why such criticisms do not undermine the propriety of regulating
commercial intimacy.
1. Physical and Emotional Intimacy of Surrogacy
An ongoing concern with surrogacy is the problem of commercializing the
intimate process of gestation. Such intimacy coupled with the invaluable benefit it
provides to commissioning couples is what I posit fosters the struggle around
legalizing commercial surrogacy. Commercializing pregnancy in surrogate
motherhood creates a transaction in intimacy for physical, biological, and
emotional processes. This intimacy is clarified and expanded upon in the empirical
studies outlined above. While the purchase of intimacy does occur in other
contexts, it is usually regulated, is often banned, and is always fraught with
concerns.70
The nature of the intimacy in surrogate motherhood can be described on a
number of interlocking levels. First, surrogate agreements involve a long-lasting
and intense involvement in the bodily integrity of the surrogate. Surrogate contracts
assert control over the lives of surrogates while they gestate; their body is literally
being used for someone else’s purposes in a constant and inseparable manner.
There is no going home at the end of the day; there are no breaks and one cannot
really quit or get a new job without complete upheaval and the suffering involved
in undergoing an abortion.71 Once a pregnancy is initiated, surrogates are literally
trapped, physically, into their agreements and into their entangled relationship with
intentional parents.72 Moreover, commissioning parents are interested in and can
even assert control over the daily actions of the surrogate.73 Surrogacy contracts
may prevent surrogates from international travel or participation in high impact

70. See infra Part I.B.2 for a general discussion of the concerns raised by
commercializing intimacy. See also Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange,
119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 493–96 (2005).
71. See, e.g., Morgan Holcomb & Mary Patricia Byrn, When Your Body Is Your
Business, 85 WASH. L. REV. 647, 657 (2010) (“Provisions such as the specifics of the IVF
treatment, prenatal care, and whether the intended parents can attend medical appointments
are incorporated into the contract to reinforce that, while the surrogate may be the one
carrying the child, it is not her pregnancy. From the parties’ perspectives, the pregnancy
belongs to the intended parents and the surrogate is hired to provide a valuable service.”
(footnotes omitted)).
72. Id. at 657 n.42 (“Many surrogacy contracts incorporate provisions related to
abortion and fetal reduction. The surrogate has a constitutional right to have an abortion;
however, in many instances the parties to a surrogacy contract may insert a provision into the
contract requiring that the surrogate waive her right to an abortion or stating that an
abortion must be performed in certain circumstances.”).
73. Id. at 672; Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational
Surrogacy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 413 (2012).
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sports or cigarette smoking, or they may require certain actions and encumber
surrogates’ freedom generally.74
Second, from a biological perspective, the physical interconnectedness between
the fetus and the gestational mother has been well documented, and her actions do
have effects on the fetus.75 The fetus and surrogate mother share bodily functions,
physical space, and molecular biology.76 Thus, it is unlikely that intended parents
can be expected to leave a gestational mother to act in any manner she chooses.
More fundamentally, the act of gestation is decidedly different from incubation
from a scientific perspective. Gestation involves a real biological interdependency
over the course of forty weeks that affects both the fetus and the surrogate and that
should not be ignored.77 The surrogate is affected on a constant basis by the fetus
growing inside her and vice versa.
Finally, as described in empirical studies described above, this physical
involvement and interrelatedness is coupled with long-lasting emotional
connections, if not with the fetus, then with the intended parents.78 Such emotional
connectedness and the humanity involved in these commercial transactions can
create high-level disputes and suffering. Surrogate mothers have reported feeling
devastated when their involvement in the process is minimized.79 Gestating a fetus
may not lead to motherhood,80 but it is also not like building a cabinet.
Commercializing the singular, long-term nature of the gestational process is
complex. When human life is changing hands, the nature of these transactions
should be considered to ensure that the interests of the children and the parties
involved are being protected.

74. See, e.g., Kimberly R. Willoughby & Alisa A. Campbell, Having My Baby:
Surrogacy in Colorado, 31 COLO. LAW. 103, 105–06 (2002) (itemizing the kind of
restrictions found in surrogacy contracts).
75. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d
689 (N.J. 1967) (discussing effects of rubella on fetus); Cori S. Annapolen, Maternal
Smoking During Pregnancy: Legal Responses to the Public Health Crisis, 12 Va. J. Soc.
Pol’y & L. 744 (2005); Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking
the Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 Hastings L.J. 505 (1992).
76. See, e.g., Robert Martone, Scientists Discover Children’s Cells Living in Mothers’
Brains, SCI. AM. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=scientists
-discover-childrens-cells-living-in-mothers-brain; Nancy Shute, Beyond Birth: A Child’s
Cells May Help or Harm the Mother Long After Delivery, SCI. AM. (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=fetal-cells-microchimerism (describing a
process of cellular exchange between gestating mother and fetus known as microchimerism);
see also Catherine Arcabascio, Chimeras: Double the DNA—Double the Fun for Crime
Scene Investigators, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 439
(2007) (citing J. Lee Nelson, Microchimerism: Incidental Byproduct of Pregnancy or Active
Participant in Human Health?, 8 TRENDS IN MOLECULAR MED. 109, 109 (2002)).
77. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. Id.
80. For a discussion of legal parenthood, see infra Part II.A.2.
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2. Harms of Commodification
Due to the intimacy involved in surrogacy described in detail above, a major
critique of commercializing surrogacy is that such a market inappropriately
commodifies the human body as a form of baby selling or as a form of selling
gestational services.81 As one scholar puts it, by commercializing the womb, “[w]e
potentially do harm to ourselves and to human flourishing if we treat something
integral to ourselves as a commodity, that is, as separate and fungible.”82 It is
argued that commodification of services or things that are self-defining (i.e.,
integral to the self) should not be put on the market because doing so harms
participants specifically and society broadly.83 These harms include both
consequentialist and intrinsic concerns regarding the effects of exchanges of body
parts for money.84 Consequentialist harms refer to specific empirical effects of
commodification on the value of persons in society and the way persons relate to
one another; the intrinsic arguments concern the problematic nature of the sale
itself.85
It is argued that there is a cost to society in allowing the sale of humans, bodily
organs, and capacities because we see ourselves as more than mere commodities.
Allowing ourselves and our body parts to be traded for money forces us to perceive
ourselves in terms of our own monetary worth. Surrogates thus might view
themselves and their bodies merely in terms of their saleable worth and not for their
essential value as part of humanity. Women might then be bought and sold based
on their worth in surrogacy. Thus, commercializing intimacy is critiqued as
problematic because selling intimacy compromises the personal and emotional
nature of that intimacy and treats female body parts not as an end in themselves but
as a means to an end.
In addition, it is argued that the intimate nature of the surrogacy relationship
warrants consideration to protect vulnerable parties from the emotional harm that
such intimate contracts can cause.86 As one scholar noted, “[t]he commissioning
couple does not just enter into a contract with the surrogate: they embark on a
relationship with her.”87 Human emotions, pain and suffering as well as joy, often

81. For a discussion of these alternate ways of viewing the commodification inherent to
surrogacy, see Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 8, at 414–20.
82. Sonia M. Suter, Giving in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 222 (2009); see Radin, supra note 10, at 1930–36.
83. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 137–38 (1996).
84. See Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, in
THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 87, 94–95 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000); Suter,
supra note 82, at 234–35; Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing
the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 693 (2003).
85. See Sandel, supra note 84, at 94–95; Suter, supra note 82, at 234–35; Note, supra
note 84, at 693.
86. See Jennifer A. Parks, Care Ethics and the Global Practice of Commercial
Surrogacy, 24 BIOETHICS 333, 335 (2010).
87. Id. at 338 (emphasis omitted).
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revolve around commercial surrogate transactions and can be devastating to
participants whose expectations are not met.88
These harms are amorphous and at times overstated, particularly as compared to
the real financial and procreative benefits involved in commercializing surrogacy.
However, they are still relevant and intuitive given both are real anathema toward
selling humans—children, organs and fetuses included—as well as selling love and
sex and the real effects the sale of human goods can have on the participants. Such
vulnerabilities and potential harms are reflected in the empirical studies discussed
above as well as more abstract harms to humanity. Most pointedly, it is the
emotional and physical vulnerability of the surrogate mother whose humanity cries
for protection from harm and exploitation and in protection of her human dignity.
3. The Mixed Commodification Analysis
If one takes the commodification concerns as described above seriously, the
only way to make sense of surrogacy as a financial transaction is to recognize the
complex nature of the transaction that includes both the benefits of
commercialization to the surrogates and the intended parents and the intimacy
involved. “Incomplete commodification” was originally coined by Margaret Radin
to acknowledge that some commodities are monetized, but not entirely.89 Margaret
Radin asks, can we both know the price of something and simultaneously know
that it is priceless?90 While Radin recommends incomplete commodification by
regulating some markets without banning them, such as prostitution,91 she does so
in the context of struggling with incomplete commodification in order to preserve
the non-commercial nature of some transactions.92 For instance, Radin is willing to
accept incomplete commodification in the context of prostitution in order to
pragmatically deal with the reality that a market for prostitution will continue to
exist despite bans in a manner that hurts sex workers. However, she fears the
commodification of such intimacy and wants to inhibit commercialization of
surrogacy in order to avoid the “domino effect.”93
Joan Williams and Viviana Zelizer have taken the possibility of incomplete
commodification and spun it in a more positive light through which they describe
many transactions that involve both money and intimacy. They have argued for a
“differentiated ties” view of the commodification of intimacy,94 or, in its most
recent application by Zelizer, a “connected lives” theory of commodification.95

88. Id. at 335 (“[H]uman beings are not best understood as individual rights bearers or
property owners, but as vulnerable beings-in-relationship who rely on one another for care,
concern, nurture, and identity.”).
89. See RADIN, supra note 83, at 102.
90. Id.
91. See Radin, supra note 10, at 1932–34.
92. See RADIN, supra note 83, at 134–39.
93. See Radin, supra note 10, at 1933–34.
94. See Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify:
That Is Not the Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 362, 369 (Martha M. Ertman &
Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
95. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005).
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Williams and Zelizer argue that many transactions contain both elements of
commercialization and non-monetizable intimacy, care or emotional connection.96
In other words, one could accept money for actions that are at least partially
motivated by a sense of social connectedness or altruism and perform the job in a
caring, selfless manner.97 This perspective seeks to recognize both the market and
caring/selfless aspects of certain endeavors, refusing to see them as mutually
exclusive: “Instead of living in segregated spheres, people participate in dense
networks of social relations that intertwine the intimate and economic dimensions
of life.”98
In her recent book The Purchase of Intimacy, Viviana Zelizer describes in great
detail the concept of mixed commodification, which she terms “connected lives,”
and its wide-ranging applications.99 She explains that conceptual approaches
towards commodification have taken two diametrically opposed directions: (1)
“hostile worlds” and (2) “nothing-but.”100 In “hostile worlds” approaches, that
which is intimate, private, emotional, and built on love and care should not be
commoditized or in any way allowed into the market.101 As Margaret Radin
explains, commodification of children, people, body parts, sex, etc., cheapens the
nature of these beings and attributes, devalues humanity, and thus has serious
negative effects on the individuals involved and on society at large.102 Those with a
hostile worlds approach to intimacy argue for a complete disaggregation of intimate
attributes and the market keeping each in its own separate sphere.103 There is
opposition to not only surrogate motherhood, but to intimate, personal human
entities such as children, sex, organs, sperm, eggs, votes, motherly caregiving, and
wifely housekeeping services.
In the diametrically opposed “nothing-but” approach, scholars argue that the
market should be open to just about everything, including children and sex.104 They
argue that the market is its own best regulator and that keeping intimate objects out
of the market is not realistic or wise. Rather, the market can attribute appropriate
values to all commodities and market forces will ensure that they are best
distributed. As Zelizer explains, “[F]or economic reductionists caring, friendship,
sexuality, and parent-child relations become special cases of advantage-seeking
individual choice under conditions of constraint—in short, of economic

96. Williams & Zelizer, supra note 94, at 369.
97. See Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money—Or Both?, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 123, 132 (2000) (“One could, of course, let self-interest overtake altruistic concerns
and do the work in a cold-hearted way, but this not implied a priori. One could, in fact, be
exceptionally nonmaterialistic and generous.”).
98. See Williams & Zelizer, supra note 94, at 366.
99. ZELIZER, supra note 95, at 32.
100. Id. at 28–32.
101. Id. at 22.
102. Radin, supra note 10, at 1915–17.
103. Maxine Eichner, The Family and the Market—Redux, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
97, 99–102 (2012) (citing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983)).
104. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for
Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (2009); Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 344.
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rationality.”105 Others, Zelizer argues, believe that everything can be reduced to
cultural beliefs or political or exploitative bases.106
According to Zelizer, “People . . . blend intimacy and economic activity [and]
actively engage[] in constructing and negotiating ‘Connected Lives.’”107 “[P]eople
create connected lives by differentiating their multiple social ties from each other,
marking boundaries between those different ties by means of everyday practices,
sustaining those ties through joint activities (including economic activities), but
constantly negotiating the exact content of important social ties.”108 Even in the
most intimate of relationships—between persons in the same household or between
paramours, there are both economic and intimate aspects to the interactions.109 In
other words, we are connected to people in many ways, many of which include
some level of economic connection and intimate, personal connections: plural
meanings are a constant reality.110
Indeed, the commercialization of women’s gestational capacity is, descriptively,
a paradigmatic example of the “connected lives” approach developed by Zelizer.
First, surrogates describe elements of both monetary and altruistic motivation for

105. ZELIZER, supra note 95, at 29.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id. at 32.
109. Id. at 33.
110. A number of other scholars have made these claims about surrogacy and other
commodities in the legal context. In a previous article, I have used Zelizer’s theory to argue
that it is problematic to exclude all paid caregivers, especially foster parents, from the
possibility of receiving de facto parental status based on the issuing of payment itself. See
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, and Kinship: Should Paid Caregivers Be
Allowed to Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L. REV. 25, 55–59 (2009). Such a
hostile worlds approach fails to acknowledge the important role finances play in raising all
children and discriminates against the poor and rational minorities who are in more need of
state funding in order to provide necessary care and live-in nannies who create deep
emotional ties with children as a way to earn a living. Martha Ertman has argued for a more
realistic mixed commodification perspective on parenthood markets. While not going so far
as to argue for full commodification like Posner, she does argue for a regulated market in
paying for sperm, acknowledging that money does not necessarily corrupt parent-like
relationships and allows for financial contracts between spouses regarding childcare
responsibilities. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New and
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 55–59 (2003). Naomi Cahn has
argued that household work needs to be compensated and that such compensation will not
corrupt the spousal relationship. Naomi R. Cahn, The Coin of the Realm: Poverty and the
Commodification of Gendered Labor, 5 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 1 (2001). Similarly,
Katherine Silbaugh argues for limited commodification of women’s household labor to
combat the problem of the “cashless woman,” explaining that it is the sales of children and
sex that are objectionable, not women’s receipt of money for caretaking work. Katherine
Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 81,
104–07 (1997); see also Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 71–73
(2002). While conceding that regulation keeping these goods and services from being freely
marketable remains relevant, Williams and Zelizer argue that banning all payment to impute
value to such services is neither practical nor desirable. Williams & Zelizer, supra note 94, at
366–69.
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engaging in agreements.111 Indeed, most list altruism as the primary motivation for
becoming a surrogate mother, although there is no doubt that commercial
surrogates view their acts as work as well and appreciate and expect the
compensation.112 Second, commercializing gestation involves selling bodily
functions in an ongoing manner that can be potentially exploitative and devalue the
non-commercialization of human life. This is because of the intimate nature of
gestation described above, which leads to intimate relationships and attachments.113
Third, surrogacy involves the transferring of a human child from one woman’s
womb to a couple’s arms. The fetus’s needs must be looked after during the
pregnancy and the children’s needs and interests must be attended to after the birth.
Mixed commodification allows us to accept that there are multiple identifiable
purposes for our actions. Thus, altruistic motives do not cancel or encroach on
monetary fiscal motives. Moreover, the nature of an act can be both deeply
personal and saleable, and thus the relationship between the surrogate and the
commissioning couple can be recognized without negating the commercial nature
of the transaction.
4. From a Descriptive to a Prescriptive Mixed Commodification Analysis of
Surrogacy
Zelizer’s project regarding the nature of intimate relations and intimacy’s
interaction with the market is largely descriptive.114 In her book, by reviewing a

111. Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 29–31 (citing, among others, Hilary
Hanafin, The Surrogate Mother: An Exploratory Study, in 45 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS
INTERNATIONAL 3335–36-B (1985)); van den Akker, Experience of Surrogacy, supra note
35, at 150–51.
112. Baslington, supra note 39, at 58, 62–63, 67; Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 27,
at 30 (citing Joan Einwohner, Who Becomes a Surrogate: Personality Characteristics, in
GENDER IN TRANSITION: A NEW FRONTIER 123, 123–32 (Joan Offerman-Zuckerberg ed.,
1989)) (“40% of women state the fee was their main, although not their only, motivator.”);
Edelmann, supra note 1, at 128.
113. See supra Part I.B.1.
114. Zelizer herself, although attesting to making a descriptive argument, pushes this
boundary as well. ZELIZER, supra note 95, at 297. She concedes, for instance, that the
otherwise flawed hostile worlds/nothing-but analyses of the relationship between the market
and intimacy, “zones of intimacy operate according to different rules from other sorts of
organizations.” Id. at 291. While not going so far as to say that such alternate rules are
appropriate, it can be inferred. In fact, later she explains that the insistence on “perpetuating
the myth of inescapable divisions and battles between the worlds of sentiment and
rationality, of market and domesticity, hostile worlds arguments divert us from real
solutions.” Id. at 297. She urges scholars to take up her perspective on interconnected lives
in order to “get the interaction of intimacy and economic activity right.” Id. at 298. Zelizer
points to some examples of injustices that the failure to recognize mixed commodification or
connected lives thinking perpetuates: (1) failure to compensate women for household work;
(2) low pay for caregivers; (3) discrimination against mothers on welfare; and (4)
prohibitions on child labor that can harm households. Id. at 298. These harms result from
closing off markets in the intimate sphere entirely. However, she asserts the challenge is to
refrain from attempts to separate intimacy from economy entirely or to blend them entirely,
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considerable number of legal cases, Zelizer demonstrates how both intimacy and
economics are a factor in many interactions. More specifically, she demonstrates
how the hostile worlds and nothing-but perspectives often expressed in judicial
opinions miss the complex reality of what transpires between persons. Her basic
proposition is that, descriptively, “in all social settings, intimate and impersonal
alike, social ties and economic transactions mingle, as human beings perform
relational work by matching their personal ties and economic activity.”115 Her
claim is that intimate relations cannot be separated entirely from the market, but
they cannot be mixed or confused with pure market transactions either—intimate
relations often have elements of both and thus can be partly marketable and partly
unmarketable.
In this Article, I push Zelizer’s descriptive theory firmly into the realm of the
prescriptive. Not only do certain transactions contain elements of both intimacy and
economics, some transactions should be regulated to take into account the intimacy
and personal nature of relations as well as the economic elements involved. As the
commercial nature will be governed by the market, regulation should be enacted to
reflect the intimacy. This is not only to deal with pragmatic realities as described by
Radin,116 but because that is the normatively best way to deal with sales of intimate
objects. Markets in intimacy will continue to flow and develop, and such sales can
be extremely beneficial to participants and to society as a whole and thus should
not be prohibited. This is the case with surrogacy. But, when significant amounts of
intimacy are involved, these markets should be regulated and such regulation can
be justified to recognize the plural nature of such markets.117
5. Towards a Regulatory Framework for Commercial Surrogacy
The first question that follows is: what is sufficient intimacy to necessitate
regulation? Many broad categories of transactions involve some degree of
intimacy, such as any sale of labor services or the sale of property. Labor and
property laws do regulate such intimacy to some degree. But such categories entail
less intimacy then surrogate motherhood because they are more separable from the
self. I would argue that there are at least three broad categories of intimate
transactions that are so intimate as to require regulation specifically aimed at
protecting and recognizing their intimacy: the sale of body parts, the sale of bodily
functions, and the sale of love—all of which are significantly tied up with the
self.118 Ultimately, commodification is a matter of degree and not bright line
but rather to “create fair mixtures. We should stop agonizing over whether or not money
corrupts, but instead analyze what combinations of economic activity and intimate relations
produce happier, more just, and more productive lives.” Id. Although admitting that money
can corrupt, and must be restrained, she urges that we must accept mingling and then
determine how to resolve mingling in the most productive and appropriate manner. Id. at
298–99.
115. Id. at 288.
116. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 70, at 494–99 (describing the appropriateness of
regulation to differentiate intimate markets from other markets).
118. See Michele Goodwin, Relational Markets in Intimate Goods, 44 TULSA L. REV.
803, 805 (2009) (“The dual statuses of intimacy are employed here—both as a metaphor for
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rules.119 For instance, I would argue that surrogacy is more intimate than egg and
sperm sales because of the longer bodily and emotional commitment that gestation
entails and thus more in need of regulation. Others may disagree depending on the
importance placed on genetics. I am arguing for a pragmatic, context-specific
approach that takes intimacy seriously, particularly when the intimacy is so
prevalent that it overwhelms the transaction. But, what distinguishes my
perspective from an anti-commodification perspective is that I believe that within
these categories of intimacy a market can flourish in an ethical and legal manner.
Moreover, my argument is not grudging, accepting commodification because I
believe it is not preventable;120 rather, I believe that a regulated market that
recognizes the commercial and intimate aspects of surrogacy transactions is
befitting and appropriate at least in a domestic market.121
Regulation is the appropriate response to recognition of plural meanings as it
provides an intermediate position between a ban and full marketization and
differentiates intimate markets recognizing the complex nature of such
transactions.122 Still, a regulatory response to recognizing the relevance of mixed
commodification is not obvious, although first raised by Radin in her discussion of
incomplete commodification.123 In the context of surrogacy, Radin nonetheless
opted for a ban on commercializing gestation.124 Ertman, although recognizing the
relevance of mixed commodification in intimate markets, uses it to justify the
mostly free market in donor sperm.125 Both of these positions miss the mark. The
reason to turn mixed commodification from a descriptive tool to a normative
framework creating the need for regulation is that it better allows for the benefits of
surrogacy, while eliminating or minimizing the potential harms.
Regulation can be carefully drafted to contend with the high levels of intimacy
involved, as well as the positive benefits marketization provides. On the one hand
this approach recognizes that there is a cost to full commodification that could
harm participants and undermine our notions of the sanctity of personhood more
generally. On the other hand, there is no reason to lose the benefits of markets in
intimate relationships and in bodily functions because intimacies are frequently
exchanged for money. Rather, the markets should be harnessed to reap the benefits
while taking care not to harm the participants and society more broadly.
relationships and affinity linkages . . . and also as the term relates to the exclusively yours:
biological goods, such as kidneys, ova, sperm, and babies.”). I add to intimate relationships
and body parts described as “intimate” by Goodwin the leasing (selling) of bodily functions
such as gestation.
119. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 8, at 422.
120. See, e.g., Suter, supra note 82, at 220–21, 232 (describing how she “‘give[s] in’” to
a baby market despite deep concerns and idealized notions that would favor prohibition of
baby markets).
121. See infra Part II.
122. See Hasday, supra note 70, at 528 (“A child is not a commodity and should not be
subject to the same rules of economic exchange applied to commodities.”); see also Viviana
A. Zelizer, From Baby Farms to Baby M, SOCIETY, Mar./Apr. 1988, at 28 (suggesting that
proper regulation could make surrogacy a completely acceptable transaction but not
specifying what kind of regulation or oversight would be necessary).
123. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
125. See Ertman, supra note 110, at 28–35.
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The question that follows will be discussed at length below: What kind of
regulation, specifically, may be appropriate in the context of surrogate
motherhood? Recognizing the regulation may be appropriate only begins the
conversation. Inappropriate regulation, in fact can do more harm than good to
markets in intimacy.126 Effective regulation of intimate transactions would
recognize and protect the intimacy, avoiding to the extent possible the harm it can
cause to vulnerable parties as well as the damage it can cause to self-perception and
the non-monetary aspects of personhood generally. Yet, it would also allow the
market to flourish in a fair and reasonably stable manner. Regulators should
acknowledge empirically the emotional connections surrogates form with intended
parents, and potentially the fetus as well.127 Regulation should also acknowledge
the significant benefits surrogacy has reaped for infertile couples, the general
satisfaction attested to by all parties and the lack of litigation resulting from the
vast majority of agreements.
6. Responding to Criticism of Mixed Commodification
A number of scholars have argued that mixed commodification as a framework
for exploring intimate transactions is particularly problematic, perhaps more so
than full commodification or complete noncommodification. Some legal scholars
criticize mixed commodification approaches because regulation of intimate markets
asymmetrically impacts women as most of the taboo trades—surrogacy,
prostitution, and egg sales—involve women’s labor.128 This argument is of course
true of complete anti-commodification arguments as well, and even more so
because such approaches would entirely ban intimate trade. It is not particularly
surprising that trades involving intimacy and human body parts often, but not
always, involve women’s work.129 Women have traditionally been pegged with
much of the caregiving and domestic work that involves intimacy.130 The

126. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 70, at 522 (discussing distributive costs of limiting
financial compensation for intimate exchanges).
127. See infra Parts I.A & I.B.1.
128. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1741–42
(2010) (while admitting that commodification arguments also apply to gender neutral sales
of organ and to male sperm, she nonetheless argues that the bulk of anti-commodification
arguments are directed at woman’s labor).
129. For instance, the sale of organs. See, e.g., David E. Chapman, Comment, Retailing
Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 405
(1983) (“[S]ociety should not view the sale of human organs any differently than the sale of
other necessary commodities such as food, shelter, and medication.”); Shelby E. Robinson,
Comment, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems for Compensating Organ
Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1019, 1050 (1999) (arguing that America’s deficit of
transplantable human organs can be solved through commodification).
130. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a)(5) (West 2009) (“[D]ue to the nature of the roles of men and
women in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
women.”); see Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1129 (2005). See
generally Radin, supra note 10 (discussing the interplay between market-inalienability and
prostitution, baby-selling, and surrogate motherhood, all of which involve the intimate use of
women’s bodies).
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disproportionate effect on women also rests on the biological reality that only
women can gestate babies or produce eggs.131 Increasing gender equality has
involved men in such domestic jobs as well. Such jobs can be regulated while still
providing sufficient compensation that values intimacy. Regulation should work to
protect vulnerability and value intimacy and not work distributive injustice on
workers involved.132
More interesting are arguments that mixed commodification is particularly
problematic for allowing the mixing of money and intimacy in transactions and
that, as a result, it would be preferable to allow either complete commodification or
complete noncommodification.133 For instance, Mary Anne Case argues that
allowing intimacy in commercialization may hurt the employee in the context of
domestic help.134 She explains that calling domestic help part of the family does not
come from an egalitarian perspective but one of hierarchy and that pure commercial
relationships are perhaps more appropriate.135 Similarly, being part of the family
can harm one’s ability to earn the highest wages possible and undermine one’s
readiness to make demands in one’s own economic self-interest.136
But, as Case soon thereafter admits, domestic help also seek and benefit from
this intimacy and thus it does not appear that she is arguing that mixing is
avoidable.137 Later, she posits that many employers seem to prefer a more businesslike relationship with employees, even when employees prefer intimacy, but she
also admits that employers purchase love for their children when they hire
caregivers.138 The intimate worker—whether domestic laborer or surrogate
mother—is the more vulnerable party and tends to have less in terms of power and
material resources.139 Thus, if such a worker prefers a more commercial, less
intimate relationship, that should be her choice and will be relevant in the
regulatory framework I propose below as well.140 But it is problematic for
employers to ignore the sensitivity of the relationship involved and the frequently
desired recognition of intimacy voiced by the intimate worker.141
As Case describes it, intimate labor is complicated. Intimacy and
commercialization create a cloudy, complex dynamic. Ultimately, her description is
of a mixed, complex system of commodification in domestic labor and the harms

131. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the Global Market
for Fertility Services, 27 LAW & INEQUALITY 277, 305–07 (2009).
132. See Hasday, supra note 70, at 517–22.
133. See Case, supra note 130, at 1131 (“Whereas Radin focused on the hope and
promise of incomplete commodification, I in this essay shall concentrate on its risks, on the
double bind incomplete commodification itself can pose.”).
134. Case, supra note 130, at 1132–35.
135. Id. at 1137–43.
136. Id.; see also Pande, supra note 11, at 986–88 (describing how surrogates use
intimacy to explain why they do not demand more fees).
137. Case, supra note 130, at 1139–40.
138. Id. at 1136.
139. See Parks, supra note 86, at 338–39.
140. See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
141. See Parks, supra note 86, at 339.
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that could result from such intimacy to the parties, especially to the employees.142
Thus her arguments buttress the appropriateness of regulation to contend with such
vulnerabilities. While intimacy can make the intimate worker vulnerable,
recognition of this intimacy does not create the vulnerability; it only attempts to
protect the vulnerable party.
Kimberly Krawiec criticizes mixed commodification approaches because taboo
markets are then “tolerated, but not embraced, and this uneasy accommodation
directly impacts commercial providers of sex, oocytes, and surrogacy.”143 The
focus of her criticism is on what she perceives as mixed commodification’s
insistence that women who engage in surrogacy or oocyte sales do so for altruistic
reasons and not for profit.144 But the mixed commodification argument that Zelizer
puts forth is more complex than this portrayal—it is not altruism or profit, it is both
and both should be recognized.
The profit motive should be recognized as permissible by allowing profitable
payment and the altruistic, intimate element recognized through regulations that
protect the parties and provide rights and status to the intimate worker.145
Regulations created to recognize mixed commodification should not prevent
women from profiting from their work. Such regulations can give women more
rights; the ability to rescind agreements and the right to receive counseling. While
exploitation arguments may weigh in favor of limits on payments in some
contexts,146 the idea of mixed commodification should be to allow the commercial
trade, but to put forward regulations that recognize intimacy through giving rights
and status to the subject of the sale of intimate goods. Indeed, arguments that mixed
commodification only increases exploitation and stigma are misguided. Regulations
should increase the status of such workers by giving them recognition and rights
beyond contractual terms.
C. Relational Autonomy: Maximizing without Ensuring Autonomy
Another commonly voiced concern about surrogate motherhood is that it
exploits poor women who do not have other means of earning money.
Commentators previously predicted that these contracts would employ poor women
as an underclass for the privileged.147 Concerns are also expressed that brokers take
advantage of surrogates and make too much money from the use of the surrogate’s
body.148 Images of Brave New World149 scenarios in which the rich hire the poor to

142. See Case, supra note 130, at 1132–37.
143. Krawiec, supra note 128, at 1743.
144. Id. at 1757.
145. Krawiec’s article focuses on egg donors. In general, I am more concerned with the
intimacy involved in surrogacy than for egg donors as surrogates have an ongoing
relationship with the fetus and commissioning family in a way that egg donors do not. In
fact, although the process is less pleasurable and more intrusive, egg donors are more like
sperm donors than surrogates. Thus, less regulation, if any, would be needed to protect egg
donors.
146. See infra Part II.B.5.
147. See supra notes 14, 60 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Anne Donchin, Reproductive Tourism and the Quest for Global Gender
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incubate their children with much sacrifice and little profit abound in reaction to
surrogacy.150 Empirical research does not bear out this fear in the studies of
domestic surrogacy in the United States, Europe, and Israel.151 In international
surrogacy, however, the fears are more substantiated.152
Still, a decision to become a commercial surrogate, undergoing pregnancy and
labor for money on behalf of another family, is difficult.153 As described above,
surrogacy involves the choice to lend one’s body for a considerable duration for the
purposes of another family and to undergo numerous medical procedures and labor
for financial remuneration. One’s body, time, and freedom are purchased in an
extricable manner. Contracts often restrict women’s actions, as does the nature of
pregnancy itself.154 And, those who broker and organize a surrogate’s services do
usually still have an advantage over her in terms of resources and information,
which makes the surrogate more vulnerable.155 There may be many social and
financial pressures affecting such a decision. Being a surrogate is such a unique
experience that even if a woman has been pregnant before, perhaps she can never
be fully aware of the nature of the contract to which she is agreeing.156
Generally, however, we should be skeptical of exploitation arguments that too
narrowly focus on women as victims. Many contracts take advantage of the
Justice, 24 BIOETHICS 323, 328 (2010).
149. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
150. See, e.g., RAYMOND, supra note 10, at 143–44 (1993); John Lawrence Hill,
Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 691 (1994) (citing to a study that approximately forty
percent of all surrogate applicants were unemployed or received financial assistance); Radin,
supra note 10, at 1916–17; Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 66 n.81 (1997) (citing GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 276 (1985)
(describing a reproductive brothel)); Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely
Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 544 (2007) (arguing that the most frequent
argument against surrogacy is that it could exploit poor women who enter into surrogacy
agreements purely out of economic necessity). Contra Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal
Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2349–50
(1995); Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 78 (2007) (“[S]urrogacy may produce at least the appearance of
some social leveling: the surrogate’s fertility makes up for ‘perceived, if unacknowledged,
economic differences’ between the surrogate and the commissioning couple.”).
151. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
152. See infra Part III.A.3.
153. See also supra Part I.B.1 for a description of the emotional and physical nature of
surrogacy.
154. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
155. See Damelio & Sorensen, supra note 13, at 269.
156. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988) (“Under the contract, the natural
mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond with her child.
She never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior
to the baby’s birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed, and any decision after that,
compelled by a pre-existing contractual commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the
inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary.”); see Model Human
Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 943, 981–85 (1987); Mark
Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations: On Surrogate Reasons and Surrogacy Policies, 60
TENN. L. REV. 135, 143 (1992).
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emotional, physical, and pecuniary needs of people willing to do unseemly or
dangerous things for money. That wealthier people would not agree to be janitors,
stuntmen, or butchers or that healthy people would not agree to undergo
experimental therapies does not make agreeing to do such jobs or treatments
exploitative. On the other hand, some choices are paternalistically limited. Willing
participants cannot agree to work for less than minimum wage or engage in
activities that are deemed too dangerous. Selling ones gestational services seems to
be somewhere in between—more personal, involved, and implicating of bodily
integrity than housekeeping, but not as potentially harmful as agreeing to undergo
unproven drug therapies for high levels of compensation. Gestation is a condition,
not an irreplaceable body part. And, with modern medicine, gestation is no more
dangerous than many other activities that are legal. Still, it is a commitment of a
bodily function, long-term and involved, that does not mirror typical jobs.157 Thus,
there is room to be concerned about the autonomy of the surrogate without
paternalistically denying her right to engage in their services altogether.158
Yet, it is too simplistic a question to ask whether such choices are autonomous
or exploitative. Autonomy is not an all-or-nothing proposition; there are degrees of
autonomy.159 Autonomy is a worthy goal for all members of society, surrogates
included, and having the choice to surrogate is part of that goal.160 But not all
choices that are individually made are truly informed and free.161 Choices are not
always made individually in accordance with a liberal model of individual rights;
they are influenced by context and societal and familial pressures.162 These issues
should be taken into account. And, as discussed above, there are a number of
factors pointing towards the potential vulnerability and exploitation of a
surrogate.163
“Relational Autonomy” provides an alternative understanding of autonomy that
acknowledges the many social and contextual constraints and pressures that may be
placed on choices while simultaneously recognizing that there is value in selfdetermination.164 It provides a complex account of autonomy that considers gray

157. It is worth noting that while I frame issues regarding decisional autonomy as
concerns regarding exploitation, others have framed such concerns as part of
commodification concerns. I think separating commodification concerns that involve the
subject of the transaction from autonomy concerns involving the freedom and knowledge of
the person making the decision is logical and helpful. Admittedly, the nature of the
transaction may escalate exploitation concerns, but this does not mean that the two types of
concerns cannot be considered separately.
158. See, e.g., Damelio & Sorensen, supra note 13, at 275 (“[T]he surrogate is vulnerable
in important ways, but autonomy prevents a ban, and even positively supports the enhanced
choice that surrogacy contracts make possible.”).
159. See id. at 270–71.
160. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8–9 (1989) (“[F]eminists are centrally concerned with freeing
women to shape our own lives, to define who we (each) are, rather than accepting the
definition given to us by others (men and male-dominated society, in particular).”).
161. See Damelio & Sorensen, supra note 13, at 275.
162. See Nedelsky, supra note 160, at 8–10.
163. See infra Parts 1.B.1&2.
164. See, e.g., GRACE CLEMENT, CARE, AUTONOMY, AND JUSTICE: FEMINISM AND THE
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areas between full individualistic autonomy and complete coercion. Under the
normative framework of relational autonomy, relationships with doctors, family,
friends, community, and society at large are deemed necessary to support
autonomous choices.165 Relational autonomy takes into account the circumstances
and conditions under which decisions are made and tries to foster autonomy.
“Relational selves are inherently social beings that are significantly shaped and
modified within a web of interconnected (and sometimes conflicting)
relationships.”166
The goal of relational autonomy is to maximize and foster autonomy—not to
ensure it. Under this theory, conditions should be put in place to optimize
noncoercive and deliberate decision making. Because surrogacy is a process that
deeply implicates personhood, bodily integrity, potential emotional and physical
trauma, as well as societal constraints and familial pressures, the law should ensure
that women who choose to be surrogates are in optimal situations to make such
choices. The need for regulation is not to deny women their choices or to give them
complete freedom but to ensure optimal conditions for autonomous decision
making. Thus, regulations should seek to ensure that women are free from familial
pressure, not in economic distress and as informed as possible about the process.
II. REGULATING DOMESTIC SURROGACY
Due to the potential harms of commodification and exploitation arising from the
intimacy of surrogacy as discussed above, I have pointed to the need for regulation
of surrogacy despite the benefits of commercial surrogacy to commissioning
couples and surrogates and the lack of conflict that usually ensues from such
agreements. Commercial surrogacy involves both a financial exchange as well as
an intimate relationship. The potential harms that can result from the vulnerabilities
and emotional aspects of these relationships should be recognized. Such regulation
should protect the intimacy from full marketization, fostering a system of surrogacy
that is both commercial and intimate. Regulations should also acknowledge that the
sale of gestational services is an involved and long-term intimate commitment and
ensure that autonomy is supported to the fullest extent possible.
In considering proper regulation of surrogacy, I will first consider regulation of
domestic arrangements of surrogacy and, second, the regulation of international
surrogacy, in which a couple from one country employ the services of a foreign
ETHIC OF CARE 21–22 (1996); Susan Sherwin, A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health
Care, in THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S HEALTH: EXPLORING AGENCY AND AUTONOMY 19, 26–
28 (Susan Sherwin ed., 1998); Glennon, supra note 69, at 151–52; Nedelsky, supra note 160,
at 14.
165. See CLEMENT, supra note 164, at 42–44; Glennon, supra note 69, at 151–52;
Nedelsky, supra note 160, at 12 (“If we ask ourselves what actually enables people to be
autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but relationships—with parents, teachers, friends,
loved ones—that provide the support and guidance necessary for the development and
experience of autonomy.”); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
411, 413 (2006) (“The second criticism contends that the autonomy principle, while
estimable and essential, promotes deleterious attitudes, perhaps principally by underwriting a
corrosive individualism that alienates people from their family, friends, and physicians.”).
166. Sherwin, supra note 164, at 35; see CLEMENT, supra note 164, at 22.
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surrogate. While international surrogacy warrants its own in-depth examination,167
I want to comment on domestic and international surrogacy in tandem to
demonstrate that while domestic surrogacy arrangements can be channeled in a
manner that recognizes the intimate and commercial aspects involved, under the
same framework, international surrogacy is much more problematic. In short, it is
hard to imagine that the intimacy in international surrogacy can be properly valued
as it has been developed on a model that intends to minimize the personal nature of
surrogacy. Moreover, the distance involved creates detachment and
disenfranchisement.
In this Part, I outline some regulatory steps that can be taken to recognize the
intimacy of surrogacy while fostering a well-functioning system of domestic
commercial surrogacy. These proposals are not meant to be exhaustive or, except
for the first provision, required. The first provision for post-birth contact between
surrogates and baby at the surrogate’s election within an overall best interests
framework is the most central and necessary provision. It is also the most unique.
Essentially, it is this provision that best reflects the complex nature of surrogacy as
a transaction that is still an intimate relationship. Only by undergirding the
commercial transaction with a potentially legally enforceable relationship, and
thereby recognizing the intimate contribution the surrogate provides, does the
mixed nature of the transaction take shape. The other provisions I suggest are in use
in many states that regulate surrogacy; they can also be used to recognize intimacy
and account for the benefits of commerciality. But, under the conceptual
framework of mixed commodification and relational autonomy, prescriptive
regulatory measures are a matter of degree and good regulation can of course take
multiple forms.
A. Post-Birth Contact Between Surrogates and Baby
The primary regulatory response that I introduce to reflect the mixed
commodification and relational autonomy perspectives on commercial surrogacy is
to provide surrogates with a legally enforceable opportunity for post-birth contact
with the baby that they gestated. Although such an election would have to be within
the context of an overall best interests analysis and may not provide for extensive
or long-lasting visitation, it would give surrogates legally recognizable status as
more than just a contract worker. Such a provision recognizes the intimate
relationship the surrogate has with the baby and gives credence to the relationships
that surrogates tend to build with commissioning families during the surrogate
process. Moreover, such post-birth contact dignifies the surrogate and her body,
treating her as more than a means to an end and contends with the surrogate’s
potential vulnerabilities and the power imbalances that most surrogate
arrangements entail.
In this Part, I describe the regulatory framework for the post-birth contact that I
propose. I then discuss the issue of the legal definition of parenthood which is

167. See generally Margaret Ryznar, International Commercial Surrogacy and Its
Parties, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1009 (2010) (describing in depth the nature and effects of
international surrogacy).
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directly implicated by this discussion. In giving post-birth contact with the baby to
surrogates within the context of supporting a regulated system of commercial
surrogacy, the primary legal parents of the baby are assumed to be the
commissioning couple, but parental rights are disaggregated and deconstructed in a
manner that rejects the exclusive binary rights of traditional parenthood and
embraces a more kin-like, extended, and functional familial structure.168 Thereby,
the model of surrogate motherhood I introduce parallels the movement in family
law toward recognition of functional parenthood, the benefits of open adoption and
more extended, flexible notions of parenthood, custody, and visitation.
1. The Regulatory Framework
In adoption law, a birth mother has a right to rescind an agreement for adoption
after the baby is born.169 This right to rescind gives a mother a right to decide about
her baby’s fate once a child is born and reflects both the desire to ensure informed
consent and concerns about commodification and baby selling.170 In adoption law
the intimacy of motherhood is clear and intuitively respected.
This right to rescind does not apply in the context of surrogate motherhood, and
surrogacy is not regulated in the same manner as adoption.171 Based on differing
definitions of motherhood, the intimacy recognized in surrogacy regulation is
comparatively less. The distinction is justified due to the lack of genetic affiliation
between surrogate mother and baby in gestational surrogacy and, in traditional
surrogacy, due to the difference in intent and, potentially, the genetic relationship
with the intended father.172 In surrogacy, the baby was created because of the
surrogate contract whereas in adoption, the baby was created regardless of the
contract. Still, there could be a commissioned adoption in which the child is
conceived and born because of the intent to adopt. Under such conditions there

168. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11,
20–21 (2008); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 314–32
(2007); Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a CareBased Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 85 (2004); Laura T. Kessler, Community
Parenting, 24 WASH. U. L.J. & POL’Y 47, 74 (2007); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet
Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional
Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 428–35 (2013); Melissa Murray, The Networked
Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV.
385, 394–95 (2008).
169. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107(B) (1989) (West) (consent valid only
seventy-two hours after birth); In re Timothy W., 223 Cal. App. 3d 437, 445 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that when a birth mother has formally refused to give her consent, the court
shall order the adoptive parents to relinquish the child); Carol Sanger, Separating from
Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 443 (1996).
170. See, e.g., Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 383
n.14–15 (1990).
171. See, e.g., Kerian, supra note 2, at 118–20, 124–26, 138.
172. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing in depth the distinctions between traditional and
gestational surrogacy).
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would be a right to rescind despite the intent that the adoptive parents raise the
child. While gestational surrogacy is different in that there is no genetic tie between
the gestational mother and the baby, gestation is an important potential indicatory
of motherhood (as it is for egg donation) and consists of a long-term physical
attachment with a fetus. Thus, it should be relevant in defining legal motherhood.173
While the surrogate’s gestation on behalf of a commissioning couple may not
create full parental rights to exclusively parent a child,174 or a right to rescind
comparable to adoption, it does create an intimate relationship. In sum, while there
may be somewhat less intimacy involved in surrogacy than in adoption, there is
still a high degree of intimate contact between surrogate, fetus, and commissioning
couple that should not be ignored.
In recognition of the unavoidable intimacy in surrogacy, when surrogates do
have trouble detaching from a baby, their needs should be taken into account.175
Surrogates are potentially vulnerable to control exerted over their bodies in
surrogate contracts and empirically appear to be the parties that seek recognition
and continued contact and relationships with commissioning couples and thus are
vulnerable to the extent commissioning couples do not want such relationships.176
Empirical studies suggest that emotional attachments and the desire for ongoing
relationships exist for surrogates due to attachments to the intended family, not just
the child that was gestated.177 Surrogates, in general, are most satisfied with the
surrogacy process when such relationships continue and their work is appreciated
on a human level as well as through financial compensation.178 This research
demonstrates that many surrogates crave this relationship with intended parents
because of the familial emotional connections they develop during pregnancy.179
The legal system should recognize this reality and meet them in the middle with
legal standing that recognizes their connection to the embryo they carry and to the
commissioning intended parents with whom they have worked in intimate
partnership. Although the empirical research focuses on the connection between the
surrogate and the intended parents, it would be admittedly awkward to force a
relationship between adults and it is still appropriate that the post-birth contact
surround the baby as the baby is the source of the relationship around which the
emotional connections were built. Surrogates have created connections with the
family and post-birth contact should continue with the family with a focus on the
baby she birthed.
In sum, surrogates are not incubators that can be discarded after labor.
Surrogacy should be regulated to promote a process that is satisfactory to all
parties, without the surrogate being perceived as a temporary mechanism of aid that
can be readily discarded once the baby is born. Acknowledging intimacy under the

173. See supra Part I.B.1; see also sources cited infra note 194.
174. As discussed below, I feel that no definitive test can definitively determine exclusive
parenthood in all situations and before the child is born. See infra Part II.A.2.
175. See Parks, supra note 86, at 335–39.
176. See supra Part I.A.
177. See supra Part I.A.
178. See supra Part I.A.
179. See supra Part I.A.
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mixed commodification framework means supporting and recognizing the value of
these relationships.180
In addition, practically, as intended parents are reliant on a woman to gestate
their child, and the woman is subject to the intended parents needs and demands,
and because a child is born and separated from the laboring mother, warm,
emotional, kin-like relations are important. Indeed, to the extent that all parties
agree that a smooth surrogacy process is best, and dissatisfaction and litigation
should be avoided, the need for good relationships is central as it is the breakdown
of these relationships that appears to result in conflict.181
Thus, in the rare circumstances in which a surrogate demands ongoing contact
with the baby without coming to a mutual agreement with the intended parents in
the form of ongoing relations, an arrangement of infrequent but potentially ongoing
visitation that allows the surrogate mother to disconnect from the fetus more slowly
may be appropriate. Or, if the family can work out a more open relationship,
multiple parental-child relationships may be securely and safely established to the
benefit of all involved.182 While some would object that this violates the exclusivity
and privacy of parenthood, where procreating and raising children involves third
parties, such exclusivity may not be appropriate.183 With a baby born of artificial
means in which numerous persons contributed to creating that baby, gestation, as
well as genetics and intent, may give someone status to seek custody and other
parental rights.184 But, circumstances should be taken into account because conflict
between parental figures is not good for a child. Thus, shared parenting can only
work for parents who want or can accept this kind of arrangement. In the rare but
possible circumstance of conflict, courts would have to work with the surrogate to
create an arrangement that would allow her some continuing contact with the baby
and allow detachment over time.185 Such legal status can be accomplished through
legal precedent or set forth more clearly through regulation that provides for the
possibility of ongoing, infrequent visitation by a surrogate who requests such
rights.
The implications of this potential for legal status may be to discourage
surrogacy.186 However, this is unlikely to have a large effect because it will only
come into play in a very small percentage of cases. In most cases, such ongoing
contact is fostered regardless of legal obligations.187 And, the possibility of such
status being imposed legally will likely further encourage such ongoing
relationships. Bargaining in the shadow of the law, intended parents will be

180. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 86, at 335 (discussing how under an ethic of care,
intimate relationships should be valued and recognized).
181. See supra Part I.A.
182. See supra Part I.A.
183. See sources cited supra note 8.
184. See supra Part II.A.1.
185. Even though studies suggest that surrogates’ attachment is with the commissioning
couple, it is centered around the child such that visitation with that child is likely the
appropriate response. See supra Part I.A.
186. See Parks, supra note 86, at 339.
187. See supra Part I.A.
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encouraged to permit infrequent visits and foster ongoing warm relations.188
Moreover, it will encourage gestational surrogacy because women indicate less
attachment to embryos that do not also carry their genes. It will encourage trusted
friends or family members to act as surrogates as they may be less likely to cause
problems. Most importantly, it will encourage warm, kin-like relations between
intended parents and surrogate mothers even after the birth because such ongoing
relations are the best way to avoid conflict and promote satisfaction.189
Regulation that encourages such relationships best reflects the complicated
nature of surrogacy, which is not fully commodifiable. Such regulation is a way of
reinforcing a sociological reality and hopefully a mechanism for correcting
misunderstandings and encouraging protection of vulnerable surrogates by building
relationships. Of course, if a surrogate is not interested in continued contact, her
ability to gain such status would be irrelevant and it should certainly not be forced
upon her if it is unwanted. The goal is to regulate the practice of surrogacy to make
it more relational and responsive to the human relationships that are actually
created.190
Such a relationship-focused regime may seem forced and artificial if legalized
and not engaged in voluntarily, but it is not unique. Such practice conforms with
the movement towards open adoption, multiple parentage, de facto parental status,
and grandparent visitation rights.191 More conceptually, the goal is to make legal
relationships more reflective of actual relationships and to give more status to those
vulnerable parties who have traditionally been excluded from legal status despite
actual investment in children.192 This movement is not only aimed at providing for
the best interests of children, but also for the sake of vulnerable, intimate workers
such as caregivers and surrogate mothers.193 The overall vision is for a more
kinship-based method of caring for children that recognizes the variety of intimacy
involved in the process. Recognition of intimacy in this manner is new but not
unprecedented in the literature.194
2. The Puzzle of Defining Parenthood
Creating this framework for surrogate motherhood involvement in raising a
child implicates the captivating question of legally defining parenthood. Although I
engaged in concerted analysis of this question in my earlier thinking about
surrogacy,195 I no longer find it to be the seminal question in considering surrogate
motherhood. That is because there can be no fully satisfactory answer as to who is

188. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE. L.J. 950, 954–57 (1979) (discussing how the law affects
separation agreement negotiations at divorce).
189. See supra Part I.A.
190. See Parks, supra note 86, at 334–35.
191. See sources cited supra note 168.
192. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 168, at 394–95.
193. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 110, at 51.
194. See sources cited supra notes 111 & 168.
195. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1; Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 8.

1256

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1223

the exclusive legal mother in surrogate motherhood or even egg donation—the
genetic mother, the intended mother, or the gestational mother.196
Both gestation and genetics are important legal indicators of motherhood and
attempts to choose one over the other are fraught with circular arguments,
stereotypes, and paternalism. Looking solely to genetics to determine motherhood,
as the Ohio Court of Common Pleas did in Belsito v. Clark,197 faces two compelling
problems. First, if in gestational surrogate motherhood genetics determines
parenthood, then women who receive egg donations should not legally be
considered mothers of the children they birth. In order to differentiate surrogacy
from egg donations, courts must rely on intent, which I consider below. Second,
choosing genetics over gestation as the marker of parenthood ignores a uniquely
feminine aspect of parenting—gestation.198 Essentially, as fatherhood is defined by
genetic affiliation, a focus on genetics assumes that motherhood originates from
genetics as well, despite the more complex manner in which a mother-child
relationship is formed. Ignoring gestation, a forty week continuous process of
physical nurturing and complex interdependence,199 fails to recognize an involved

196. A large number of articles have considered this dilemma, advocating one definition
over another. See FIELD, supra note 10 (arguing for a best interest test with a presumption of
maternal custody in traditional surrogacy); SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: BRAVE NEW FAMILIES? (1994) (arguing that the woman who
gives birth to the child should be considered the legal mother of the child); ROTHMAN, supra
note 10 (arguing that the essential maternal tie is based on carrying the child in pregnancy);
Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV.
637, 673 (1993) (discussing the development of this dilemma based on the breakdown of
natural parenthood); Hill, supra note 8, at 419 (concluding that contractual intent provides a
rule of certainty in favor of the “prime movers” of the child’s conception); Ruth Macklin,
Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our Understanding of the Family, 21 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 5 (1991) (considering the various methods, including genetics, to determine the
real mother); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV.
59 (1987) (arguing for a free market in babies and reproductive services); Schultz, supra
note 8 (reasoning that contract principles further the gender neutral goals of intention and
choice in reproductive decisions); Suzanne F. Seavello, Are You My Mother? A Judge’s
Decision in In Vitro Fertilization Surrogacy, 3 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 211 (1992) (arguing
for a genetics based determination).
197. 644 N.E. 2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994).
198. See Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1358–59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that viewing gestation as opposed to genetics as the indicator of parenthood is not a violation
of equal protection due to the differences between sexes in procreation); Laufer-Ukeles,
supra note 8. See generally FIELD, supra note 10, at 123–25 (discussing differences between
gestation and AID, and the legal and practical differences between mothers and fathers “at
the moment when a child is born”); ROTHMAN, supra note 10 (arguing that care alone and
not seed should determine parenthood).
199. See ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 35–36 (describing maternal rights based on
gestation as a uniquely nurturing social and physical relationship); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR
JUSTICE 35, 39–50, 81–89 (1997); see also In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices Litig., 378
F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1147–48 (D. Neb. 2005); Nancy S. Erickson, The Feminist Dilemma Over
Unwed Parents’ Custody Rights: The Mother’s Rights Must Take Priority, 2 LAW & INEQ.
447, 461–62 (1984) (basing the rights of the birth mother on the fact that she is not only the
primary caretaking parent but also the only caretaking parent at that point). For scientific
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and biologically significant process that is uniquely feminine. This focus on
gestation is not as some critiques have argued because of a belief that women
“should” gestate their children,200 but rather recognition of the unique and valuable
contribution of gestation when it is provided.201
Moreover, attempts to point to intent as creating a legally identifiable
motherhood relationship at the time of birth cannot legitimately be distinguished
from simply enforcing contractual agreements. And, enforcing contractual
agreements regarding motherhood seems to belie notions that such relationships
should not be bought or sold in the marketplace.202 For instance, in the seminal case
of Johnson v. Calvert, the court determines motherhood as a matter of nature based
on intent and not as a matter of contract.203 The court decides that in the context of
gestational surrogacy where genetics and gestation, the two traditional natural
indicators of natural motherhood, conflict intent determines natural motherhood.204
studies demonstrating this bond, see John C. Fletcher & Mark I. Evans, Maternal Bonding in
Early Fetal Ultrasound Examinations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392, 392 (1983); John H.
Kennell & Marshall H. Klaus, Mother-Infant Bonding: Weighing the Evidence, 4
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 275, 281 (1984); Maureen A. Knippen, Microchimerism: Sharing
Genes in Illness and in Health, ISRN NURSING, 2011, available at
http://www.isrn.com/journals/nursing/2011/893819/; see also FIELD, supra note 10, at 48,
123–25; Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity
Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 44–48 (2004).
200. See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: The Evolution of Baby-Making Markets,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1914 (2009).
201. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 275–76 (2006); Jennifer S.
Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 430–31, 474–78
(2007); Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 8, at 445.
202. For a discussion of what is wrong with babyselling, see RADIN, supra note 83, at
137–38 (“If we permit babies to be sold, we commodify not only the mother’s (and father’s)
babymaking capacities—which might be analogous to commodifying sexuality—but also the
baby herself. . . . Commodifying babies leads us to conceive of potentially all personal
attributes in market rhetoric, not merely those of sexuality. Moreover, to conceive of infants
in market rhetoric is likewise to conceive of the people they will become in market rhetoric,
and this might well create in those people a commodified self-conception.”); Margaret Jane
Radin, What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling?, 26 PAC. L.J. 135, 144–45 (1995)
(address given at the McGeorge School of Law on March 4, 1994); MARGARET JANE RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 136–39 (1993). For a discussion of why intent cannot be a basis
for determining “natural” motherhood, see In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240–50 (N.J.
1988) (discussing how intentional arguments that enforce contracts align with baby-selling);
Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 765 (rejecting intent-based argument on grounds that it enforces
contracts for the sale of children); Jeffrey M. Place, Recent Development, Gestational
Surrogacy and the Meaning of “Mother”: Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal.
1993), 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 913–14 (1994).
203. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993); In
re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (declaring that
when a child is conceived by implanting anonymously donated sperm and egg, the intended
mother as expressed in the surrogacy contract—not the surrogate or the unknown egg
donor—is the lawful mother).
204. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (“We conclude that although the Act recognizes both
genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child

1258

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1223

The court could have said that the contract determined motherhood but declines to
do so; contractual motherhood would conflict with the court use of the concept of
“natural.”205 Instead the court creates a category of natural motherhood based on
intent as derived from the contract.206 But, there is no real logical distinction
between determining motherhood based on preconception intent and determining
motherhood based on a contract prepared to detail and certify such intent. The
discomfort expressed for contracting for parenthood in adoption and surrogacy
cannot be hidden by the language of intent. Arguably, regulations intended to
prevent adoption from undermining prohibitions against baby-selling are relevant
whenever there is a contract for parenting rights and status, including surrogacy.
While an adoptive baby would have been born regardless of the legal transfer of the
baby and a baby born of surrogacy is conceived due to the contract, a baby
conceived through sexual relations for the purpose of adoption would still be
subject to adoption regulations.
Intentional arguments for parenthood are also undermined in contexts in which,
despite agreements, biological donors or surrogate mothers function as parental
figures. Courts then try to reinvent notions of intent to better reflect practical
realities. For instance, in the case of K.M. v. E.G., the egg donor, who was also the
partner of the intended mother, agreed not to lay parental claims to the child in a
clear and explicit agreement.207 Yet, she raised the child with the intended mother
after the children were born.208 Courts in such circumstances legitimately do not
want to deny the genetic mother her attachment to the child.209 Ultimately, when
intentions break down or when practices do not track contractual intentions, we are
still left with the biological indicators of genetics and gestation and such affinities
persist. Although in K.M. the court attempts to differentiate between the
contractual waiver of parental rights, which is invalidated, and intent to raise the
children in a joint home, which is adopted as a crucial indicator of parenthood, this
distinction is hard to decipher.210 And, ultimately, it is the genetic relationship
added to the joint parenthood that ensued that seems to persuade the court.211
Indeed, had E.G. waived parental rights and not raised the child with K.M., it is
highly doubtful she would have succeeded in her parental claim. Intent alone by
contract is then rejected when other elements such as actual parenting and genetics
are present. Surrogacy thus creates a puzzle without an easier answer. The bottom
line is that intent, genetics, gestation, and functional care all matter in determining
parental ties, and it is difficult and perhaps artificial to separate one out as the
exclusive indicator of legal parenthood.
Yet, despite these complexities, ultimately the intended mother and intended
father almost always raise the child as their own in accordance with a surrogacy or
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to
procreate the child—that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under California law.”).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675–76 (Cal. 2005).
208. Id. at 677.
209. See id. at 679.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 679–82.
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egg donor arrangement. Thus, in the vast majority of instances, the puzzle of
defining parenthood remains a theoretical concern that need not be resolved.
Regulatory frameworks can be enacted that circumvent such definitional
complexities. In the end, however, unless harm to the child is found or exceptional
circumstances exist, the intentional parents will undertake or, in extreme and rare
cases, be awarded primary custody in the best interests of the child. The extent to
which additional parental figures may be allowed to parent is a worthwhile and
contested inquiry that is relevant in a variety of contexts,212 including surrogacy,213
but need not prevent surrogacy from happening. Although the surrogate may not be
awarded parental rights equivalent to those of a formal parent, allowing her some
continued contact with the baby and commissioning couple may be beneficial and
necessary to properly reflect the nature of the relationship.214 As discussed above,
promoting relational bonds between the surrogate, the commissioning couple, and
the baby born of surrogacy can be a positive and necessary part of the surrogacy
process.215
B. Additional Regulatory Provisions Reflecting Mixed Commodification and
Relational Autonomy
Having explored and described at length the primary regulatory provision of
post-birth contact between surrogate and baby that I propose, I will now consider
other provisions that can be used to reflect the mixed commodification and
relational autonomy framework for considering surrogacy. Unlike the contact
provision, these provisions are often already in use by states that regulate
commercial surrogacy. They may be appropriate but are not all necessary or
appropriate in any regulatory regime to foster human dignity or autonomy.
1. Gestational Surrogacy Only
Since the time of the often cited and discussed case of In re Baby M,216 in which
a child who was genetically related to the intended father and the surrogate mother
was born of a surrogate motherhood agreement, the use of surrogate motherhood
has evolved and now often is used to create children related to both the intended
mother and father through genetic affiliation.217 Alternately, surrogacy involves an

212. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 168, at 20–21; Jacobs, supra note 168, at 314–32;
Kavanagh, supra note 168, at 85–86; Kessler, supra note 168, at 74; Laufer-Ukeles &
Blecher-Prigat, supra note 168, at 421–24; Murray, supra note 168, at 394.
213. See Randy Frances Kandel, Which Came First: The Mother or the Egg? A Kinship
Solution to Gestational Surrogacy, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 165 (1994) (arguing for multiple
mothers from the perspective of a kinship relationship).
214. See supra notes 39–59 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
216. 537 A.2d. 1227 (N.J. 1988).
217. Although it is clear that most surrogacy agreements are gestational, it is hard to
pinpoint exact percentages because there is no registration or accounting of the nature of
such agreements. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 132
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egg donor other than the surrogate mother.218 In fact, empirical research indicates
that more than ninety-five percent of surrogates carry fetuses with genetic material
that is not their own.219 This process is known as gestational surrogate
motherhood.220 Most often the egg of the intended mother and the sperm of the
intended father are combined through the process of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”)
and then implanted into the womb of the paid surrogate.221 Gestational surrogacy,
as opposed to traditional surrogacy using artificial insemination by donor (“AID”),
entails a more invasive medical procedure for both the intended mother (or egg
donor) and the surrogate.222 The surrogate must have the embryo implanted in her
uterus, which is a more invasive procedure than artificial insemination.223 When an
intended mother is also the genetic mother, she undergoes a series of invasive
procedures in a manner that is significantly different from her passive and
biologically distant role in traditional surrogacy.224 The intended mother must go
through hormone treatments, an invasive surgical procedure to extract the eggs,
general anesthesia, and other medical processes similar to those experienced by a
woman who undergoes IVF and plans to carry the fetus herself.225
Having the intended mother physically involved in the process creates a
different kind of surrogacy procedure where concerns about patriarchy and babyselling may be less compelling.226 The emotional and genetic connection and
investment by the intended mother diminishes the sense that the process is one of
baby-selling as opposed to reproductive aid. Even when the intended mother is not
the egg donor—either when surrogacy is used by homosexual couples or when the
(2006); DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE
THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 80–82, 84 (2006); Erin Y. Hisano, Comment, Gestational
Surrogacy Maternity Disputes: Refocusing on the Child, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 517,
524 (2011) (“[B]ecause the surrogacy realm is largely unregulated, it is often difficult to find
accurate statistics regarding the use of gestational surrogacy arrangements.”).
218. See, e.g., Dara L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-by-State
Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
449, 451 (2009).
219. DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 355.
220. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 789–90 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
221. See Peter R. Brinsden, Gestational Surrogacy, 9 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 483 (2003).
222. See MAGDALINA GUGUCHEVA, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN
AMERICA 18 (2010) (“IVF is generally more invasive, and therefore more risky, than AI. IVF
also carries a higher risk of multiple pregnancy, which is riskier than single pregnancy.”).
223. See id.
224. See Resources: Gestational Surrogacy, THE CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH,
http://www.reproductivehealthctr.com/treatments_for_women_surrogacy.htm (“The medical
process requires that the genetic mother’s and the gestational carrier’s menstrual cycles be
synchronized. The genetic mother undergoes ovarian superovulation and egg retrieval.”);
Kerian, supra note 2, at 114.
225. See Hisano, supra note 217, at 527 (“[G]estational surrogacy uses the more
complicated procedure known as in vitro fertilization. IVF refers to the process by which a
doctor stimulates a woman’s ovaries, removes several eggs, and fertilizes the eggs outside
her body. The fertilized egg is then implanted in the gestational surrogate’s uterus.”); Jami L.
Zehr, Note, Using Gestational Surrogacy and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis: Are
Intended Parents Now Manufacturing the Idyllic Infant, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 294,
297 (2008).
226. See Scott, supra note 4, at 121.
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intended mother cannot or chooses not to use her own eggs—empirical studies
demonstrate that the added biological distance between the surrogate and the fetus
assists the surrogate mother in separating herself from the fetus she is carrying.227
And, traditional surrogates demonstrate more cognitive dissonance regarding their
beliefs about whose child they are carrying than gestational surrogates who use
genetics to dissociate as much as possible from the child.228 This greater dissonance
experienced by traditional surrogates should be avoided if possible because it can
be an indicator of difficulty in separation.229 Surrogates tend to emphasize the
genetic connection between the intended mother and the fetus, as well as their own
lack of relatedness to the fetus. While disconnection between the surrogate and the
fetus may seem artificial and problematic, demonstrating the sense in which the
surrogate is selling her body, it also facilitates a process where the surrogate
becomes less emotionally invested in the fetus and thus more able to dissociate
from the child after birth.230
Therefore, a possibility for recognizing the intimate nature of surrogate
motherhood is to allow only gestational surrogacy. However, preferring gestational
surrogacy should not be based on essentializing the genetic link and thus permitting
surrogacy only when the surrogate is not the genetic mother.231 Rather, gestational
surrogacy may be preferred because, empirically, when the surrogate is not also the
genetic donor, surrogate mothers indicate that the lack of genetic affiliation helps
them to distance themselves from the fetuses they carry.232 Many surrogates seem
to place great importance on genetics as a way to differentiate these pregnancies
from their own. To the extent that this facilitates the surrogacy process for them, it
should be acknowledged.
On the other hand, traditional surrogates do seem to place less weight on
genetics than gestational surrogates.233 And, women who gestate fetuses created
with egg donors are likely to minimize the importance of the genetic link.
Attachment is a matter of degree. Too much should not be made of the difference
between gestational and traditional surrogacy as traditional surrogates also attest to
being able to detach from the babies by focusing on the importance of social
parenthood. While studies indicate greater ease for gestational surrogates, this may
not be enough to ban traditional surrogacy, perhaps only to prefer gestational
surrogacy through guidelines or recommendations.234

227. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text; see also Edelmann, supra note 1, at
129.
228. See van den Akker, Longitudinal Comparison, supra note 37, at 282.
229. Id. at 282–83.
230. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
231. For a discussion and description of formal and functional indicators of parenthood,
see Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 168.
232. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 37.
234. Indeed, only a few studies look to mark the differences between gestational and
traditional surrogacy. See, e.g., van den Akker, Longitudinal Comparison, supra note 37, at
282 (indicating some greater difficulty experienced by traditional surrogates but not a
substantial difference).
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2. Psychological Evaluations
Psychological evaluations of surrogates and intended couples have been
suggested by legal scholars and mandated by legislation in some, but not all
jurisdictions where surrogacy is permitted.235 Regardless of regulations, such
evaluations are a matter of common practice in the commercial surrogacy
marketplace.236 In the context of such invasive, sensitive, and life-altering
arrangements, such evaluations are useful to ensure the surrogate and the
commissioning couple are psychologically fit to undergo such an arrangement. This
is important not only for the adult parties but for the child born of the arrangement
as well.237 Psychological evaluations can ensure that surrogates are fit to make such
a decision and recognize the intimate, transformative, and personal nature of the
surrogate relationship. While what it means to be psychologically fit for surrogacy
is amorphous, presumably professionals should be able to provide some threshold
screening. A surrogate, as well as a commissioning couple, should have reasonable
expectations and rational beliefs and concerns. All parties should be stable and
competent. Such evaluations can screen for exploitative arrangements in which
informed and competent decision making is not present.
3. Counseling
Separate and apart from psychological fitness, commissioning couples and
potential surrogates may be provided with counseling to ensure that they
understand the complex nature of these arrangements, thereby promoting autonomy
and avoiding exploitation. These counseling sessions would not be about fitness but
about informing and counseling, separately, the commissioning couple and the
surrogate about all the emotional and physical risks and benefits of the
arrangement.238 Counseling sessions could be informative and discursive, assessing
and addressing any and all concerns and providing as much information as

235. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 150, at 2348; Austin Caster, Don’t Split the Baby:
How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by
Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 477, 498 (2011);
Edelmann, supra note 1, at 127 (describing the common practice of psychological
evaluations); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The
New American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42
FAM. L.Q. 203, 206, 216–17 (2008) (suggesting legislation that mandates psychological
consultations); Watson, supra note 150, at 530.
236. See Kindregan & Snyder, supra note 235, at 216–17.
237. But see I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests,
96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 450–71 (2011) (contending that arguments justifying regulation of
artificial reproductive technologies for the sake of future children are logically problematic).
238. See Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 34 (“Professional support and
intervention, including therapy, before and during the surrogacy process may maximize
satisfaction rates among surrogates.”); cf. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and
Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L.
& MED. 567, 616–17 (2011) (suggesting informational counseling sessions as opposed to
psychological screenings in the context of reproductive choices).
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needed.239 The surrogate could be provided information about the law of her
jurisdiction and also be given information about other surrogates’ experiences. The
goal of such counseling would be to decrease the surrogate’s vulnerability, to help
her make an informed and deliberate choice.
Counseling sessions could be provided as a matter of course and be mandated by
legislation. And, for the surrogate, the sessions could be paid for by the
commissioning couple so as not to make this a hurdle she cannot meet as she is
undoubtedly the party who is more financially in need.240 Counseling should
identify familial, economic, and social pressures that may compromise autonomy.
While counselors likely would not be in the business of disqualifying candidates
who seem to be under what they consider too much pressure, they can help
surrogates resolve their dilemmas and make recommendations to both surrogates
and commissioning couples about the suitability of the arrangements. Many
surrogacy agencies provide counseling for surrogates voluntarily.241 Studies
indicate varied levels of satisfaction with counseling, although many find it
somewhat useful.242
4. Not First Pregnancy
Because pregnancy is a unique physiological state, and gestating a fetus and
then relinquishing the baby once born is likely to be an emotionally trying
experience, regulation can logically restrict surrogates to those who are not going
through pregnancy for the first time. It is difficult to imagine that a woman who has
never been pregnant can appreciate the nature of the agreement. Being able to
appreciate the nature of what you are contracting for is a matter of degree as
informed by relational autonomy, but certainly would seem to be enhanced by
having directly relevant experience to inform the surrogate as to the nature of the
agreement. Indeed, surrogacy agencies usually do use women who have had
children before, and perhaps this custom is worthy of regulation.243
5. Limitations on Financial Compensation
Because the demand for surrogates is high and the supply relatively low, at least
within developed countries like Canada, Israel, and some jurisdictions in the United
States that allow surrogate motherhood, the compensation is increasing at a

239. In a related proposal, Damelio and Sorensen recommend short classes on contract
pregnancy in order to ensure informed consent and enhance autonomy. See Damelio &
Sorensen, supra note 13, at 269–70, 275–76 (describing such policies as “soft law”
solutions).
240. See id. at 276–77.
241. See Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 34.
242. Compare id. (relating the results of Ciccarelli’s 1997 study, which found that access
to professional psychological support increased satisfaction among nearly all surrogate
mothers studied), with van den Akker, Experience of Surrogacy, supra note 35, at 153
(reporting that the author’s 2001 study revealed mixed results regarding the usefulness of
counseling to surrogate mothers).
243. Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 27, at 34.
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significant rate.244 And if one wants an arrangement done quickly and without too
much hassle, brokers and lawyers charge even more.245
Limiting the price paid to surrogate mothers through regulation (perhaps at a
rate that reflects the rising Consumer Price Index) can be justified for two reasons.
First, capping the price reflects the desire to ensure that surrogacy is not fully
marketized but rather appreciated for its dual function of creating intimate and
monetary relationships. The surrogacy arrangement should not solely be made
between those willing to pay the most with those willing to take the least, but in a
brokered, rational, and regulated way that accounts for the personal intimate bodily
functions that are involved. Payment should be tendered and profits and bargaining
contemplated, but regulation should monitor the exchanges. Surrogacy also should
not be prohibitively expensive in domestic markets because, as I will explain
below, domestic surrogacy should be preferred as a matter of policy to international
surrogacy.246 Second, a standard price should be fixed to avoid comparable and
drastically high prices to induce surrogates to act irresponsibly because there is no
other way for them to earn so much money. Surrogacy is an emotional and complex
arrangement and should remain a rational option among others—not the only way
for a woman to earn extravagant amounts of money quickly. Otherwise, people
may engage in the process without preparation or proper consideration, and
disasters could result.
While a limit on compensation may be advisable in order to prevent exploitation
and full marketization, mixed commodification arguments should not be used to
justify compensation limits that eliminate profits or support unpaid surrogacy
only.247 The goal of mixed commodification is to recognize the market aspects and
intimate aspects of the transaction. Too often barring or limiting payment is used to
manage commodification concerns, but there are other more effective means of
regulating the exchange of intimacy that can better support participants and ensure
the appropriateness of the exchange as I have delineated in this Article.248 Thus,
payment should be allowed, and the extent that the work is done for money should
be appreciated in addition to the extent that intimacy and relationships are also
involved in the transaction.

244. The average fee paid to a surrogate in the United States is about $25,000, but overall
costs are much greater, reaching about $100,000 to $120,000. See, e.g., Lorraine Ali & Raina
Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 2008, at 44 (the typical fee
paid to a surrogate is $20,000 to $25,000); Watson, supra note 150, at 531–32; Pande, supra
note 58, at 620.
245. See Tamara Audi & Arlene Chang, Assembling the Global Baby, WALL ST. J., Dec.
11, 2010, at C1.
246. See infra Part III.B.
247. See RADIN, supra note 83, at 137–41 (arguing that due to the high level of intimacy
involved in surrogacy and surrogate bodies and the extent that this can affect personhood,
commercial surrogacy should be banned and even unpaid surrogacy).
248. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 70, at 528–29 (suggesting that although regulation is
appropriate for intimate exchanges to limit commercialization, eliminating financial
compensation too often results in distributive injustice and less “impoverishing” should be
preferred).
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In sum, regulatory provisions that recognize intimacy are varied. I have
suggested a number of provisions that may foster good, commercial relationships.
Most centrally, allowing a surrogate to maintain a relationship with the
commissioning family through visitation is likely to empower the surrogate and
therefore foster parity between the more vulnerable surrogate and the
commissioning couple, and legally recognize the intimacy that already exists.
Regulation that encourages gestational surrogacy over traditional surrogacy, either
through mandatory counseling to that end, easing the process for gestational
surrogacy, or even by permitting only gestational surrogacy, also recognizes the
intimacy involved by acknowledging the way in which surrogates use the lack of
genetic affiliation to help them detach from the child they gestate. Exploitation is
avoided and autonomy promoted by appropriate psychological evaluations and
informative counseling sessions as well as by requiring that surrogates have been
pregnant before. Regulating the price paid to surrogates helps avoid exploitation
and recognizes intimacy, but such regulations should not undermine a surrogate’s
ability to make money and to benefit from the process. On the whole, through some
mix of these provisions and others that recognize the intimacy inherent to
surrogacy and the potential for exploitation, good regulations can be promulgated
that promote autonomy and intimate relationships in the context of domestic
surrogacy.
III. REGULATING INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY
International commercial surrogacy is now a commonly used option and
therefore domestic control over the process is waning. In this Article, the term
“international surrogacy” refers to the hiring of a surrogate that resides in a country
that is different from the commissioning parents. Whatever regulations or
prohibitions are put in place on domestic surrogacy will have limited significance if
surrogates can be readily hired abroad.249 Couples increasingly hire surrogates to
carry babies on their behalf in India, Armenia, Panama, and Ukraine.250 The state of
California with its relatively liberal surrogacy laws is also a destination for
international surrogacy.251 One of the most popular destinations for hiring

249. See Richard F. Storrow, Assisted Reproduction on Treacherous Terrain: The Legal
Hazards of Cross-Border Reproductive Travel, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 538
(2011); Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and
Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 298–99 (2005).
250. See Claire Bigg & Courtney Brooks, Ukraine Surrogacy Boom Not Risk-Free, RADIO
FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, June 4, 2011, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/womb_
for_hire_ukraine_surrogacy_boom_is_not_risk_free/24215336.html (discussing surrogacy in
Ukraine); Uday Mahurkar, Donating a Womb, INDIA TODAY, Aug. 13, 2007, at 56, available at
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Donating+a+womb/1/1174.html (discussing surrogacy in India);
Surrogacy in Armenia, SURROGACY CLINICS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.surrogacyclinics.com/
category/surrogacy-in-armenia/ (discussing surrogacy in Armenia); Leslie Minora, Gaybies: Gay
Couples in Florida Turn to Foreign Surrogacy, NEW TIMES (Broward Palm Beach), Jan. 27, 2011,
available at http://www.browardpalmbeach.com/2011-01-27/news/gaybies-gay-couples-in-floridaturn-to-foreign-surrogacy/ (discussing surrogacy in Panama).
251. Pande, supra note 58, at 619.
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surrogates is India, where surrogacy is permitted by law.252 In India surrogate
motherhood is legal, but unregulated and thus completely governed by the free
market.253 Business in reproductive tourism is thriving in India, growing at some
seven percent annually, and is approximated to be a $500 million industry.254 There
are an estimated 3000 surrogacy clinics in India.255 Current data indicates that
approximately 2000 children are born to surrogates a year in India.256 Therefore, as
India is one of the largest and most popular international markets for surrogates and
the locale where most foreign studies have been conducted, I will focus on India.
However, the discussion of the distinctions between domestic and international
surrogacy apply to any surrogacy destination to the extent that such distinctions are
reflected and are relevant.257
People use international surrogacy arrangements for at least three main reasons:
(1) domestic surrogacy is prohibited by law, or it is uncertain that a domestic
surrogacy contract can be enforced;258 (2) domestic surrogacy is more expensive
than foreign surrogacy;259 and (3) commissioning couples prefer the restrictive and
monitored nature of the surrogate process experienced by foreign surrogates.260

252. Richard F. Storrow, “The Phantom Children of the Republic”: International
Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 561, 597 n.264
(2012) (citing Nilanjana S. Roy, Protecting the Rights of Surrogate Mothers in India, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/asia/05iht-letter05.html
?_r=0 (finding that since commercial surrogacy was legalized in India in 2002, it has become
key in the country’s booming medical tourism market)); Usha Rengachary Smerdon,
Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy Between the United States and
India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 22 (2008) (“Outside of the United States, India is quickly
becoming the top destination spot for fertility tourists due to a number of interrelated factors
creating a “perfect storm” for a booming commercial surrogacy market.”). There is no
formal regulation of surrogacy contracts. There are, however, guidelines used by the clinics
themselves, but they are not enforceable in courts. See LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, GOV’T OF
INDIA, NEED FOR LEGISLATION TO REGULATE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY CLINICS
AS WELL AS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES TO A SURROGACY, REP. NO. 228, ¶¶ 1.14,
2.1–.2, at 14, 16–17 (2009), http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report228.pdf
[hereinafter LAW COMM’N REPORT].
253. See Pande, supra note 58, at 620; Ryznar, supra note 167, at 1018.
254. See Neeta Lal, Pitfalls of Surrogacy in India Exposed, ASIA TIMES, May 24, 2012,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NE24Df02.html; Krawiec, supra note 104, 225;
Pande, supra note 58, at 641; Ryznar, supra note 167, at 1016.
255. Shilpa Kannan, Regulators Eye India’s Surrogacy Sector, BBC NEWS, (Mar. 18,
2009, 22:33 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7935769.stm.
256. Lal, supra note 254.
257. For instance, although the conditions of surrogacy and exploitation are less of a
concern in the United States as compared with India, see infra notes 271–76, 287–304, and
accompanying text, the problem of distance and detaching between the commissioning
couple and the surrogate is an equal challenge when the surrogate resides in California and
the commissioning couple comes from abroad. See infra notes 277–87 and accompanying
text.
258. See Storrow, supra note 252, at 596 & nn. 254–59 (“[L]egal restrictions on assisted
reproductive procedures or limitations on access to them by certain classes of individuals
may trigger travel abroad for assisted reproductive services.”).
259. See Ryznar, supra note 167, at 1018–19 (“The typical surrogacy fee in India has
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In this Part, I will demonstrate that under a framework of mixed
commodification and relational autonomy, regulation that cannot promote a
mutually beneficial and appropriate system of commercial surrogacy cannot be
translated abroad to the commissioning of foreign surrogates. The cultural and
geographical distance between intended parents and surrogates, as well as the
intentional emphasis on commercialization in lieu of intimacy by those who
structure international surrogacy, coupled with the greater potential for
exploitation, make international surrogate transactions much more troubling than
domestic surrogate relationships. First, I will describe international surrogacy,
explaining how it is more problematic than domestic surrogacy, and then I will
begin the conversation about what can be done to discourage foreign surrogacy in
favor of domestic surrogacy.
A. Distinguishing Domestic and International Surrogacy
In this Section, I will describe how domestic and international surrogacy can be
differentiated; they are not just different locales for surrogacy. Domestic, as
opposed to foreign, surrogacy is a very different proposition. While my
descriptions of the differences focus on India, in some ways they are relevant to
any foreign surrogacy arrangements due to the increased distance, detachment,
potential for exploitation, and commercialization that I describe.
1. Conditions of Surrogacy
Unlike in domestic surrogacy, international surrogates (and the fetus being
gestated) are supervised by a foreign medical, legal, and cultural system, all of
which may not compare to the domestic system and therefore may cause
discomfort and dissociation. Medical care is not necessarily comparable to what is
expected in the home country, which may cause complications for the surrogate
and the fetus.261 Women may be subjected to more medical risks in foreign
jurisdictions that do not meet the same levels of medical care.262
Moreover, the medical system may be explicitly subject to pressure from the
surrogacy system in ways not expected or accepted in the domestic jurisdiction of
the commissioning couple.263 For instance, a number of ethical concerns were

been around $25,000 to $30,000, which is approximately a third of that in developed
countries such as the United States.” (citing LAW COMM’N REPORT, supra note 252, at ¶ 1.7,
at 11)); Pande, supra note 58, at 620.
260. See Pande, supra note 58, at 620. Pande also cites the motivation of wanting to ease
the lives of foreign surrogates who live in very dire circumstances. See id. at 623.
261. See Donchin, supra note 148, at 328 (among other differences, “[o]ften more
embryos are transferred than the home country would permit, risking higher rates of multiple
pregnancy which endanger both woman and fetus, requiring very costly prenatal and
postnatal care . . . .”).
262. See I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 1381
(2012).
263. See, e.g., Kristiana Brugger, International Law in the Gestational Surrogacy
Debate, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 665, 676 (2012).
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raised in a recent incident that resulted in the death of the surrogate.264 The
surrogate, who was in her eighth month of pregnancy, was brought to the hospital
in severe distress, and the fetus she was carrying was immediately removed. She
was then treated for her own medical issues. Apparently, under the terms of most
surrogacy contracts in India, the surrogate mother and her partner agree that if the
childbearing woman is injured or diagnosed with a life-threatening disease during
advanced pregnancy, she is to be “‘sustained with life support equipment to protect
the fetus viability and insure a healthy birth on the genetic parents’ behalf.’”265 In
essence, the fetus’s health explicitly comes before the mother’s, although both are
eventually cared for.266
In addition, as managed in India, surrogates often live in group homes during
their pregnancy.267 Their daily activities, food intake, and prenatal medical
treatment are highly monitored.268 Some clinics allow children to live with
surrogates; others permit only limited visits with children and prohibit sexual
intercourse with spouses.269 These highly restrictive conditions have been
established to ensure fetal safety,270 but also to control the surrogates and ensure
their docility and compliance with surrogate contracts.271 While this does not raise
medical concerns, it does raise ethical and legal concerns. The international
surrogate loses more of her independent humanity than a domestic surrogate would
and her entire life becomes focused on gestating the child for the commissioning
couple. As a matter of degree, such control and dehumanization is more troubling
from the perspective of commodification. It is not only her gestational services that
are rented while she essentially goes on with her life for the duration of the
pregnancy, but her entire body is rented out and housed at the cost of the
commissioning couple.
Another defining characteristic of international surrogacy is the very high use of
Cesarean sections (“C-sections”). Natural labor is not a part of the process as
overseen by supervising doctors.272 Rather, C-sections are performed as a matter of

264. See Lal, supra note 254.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., Pande, supra note 11, at 981; Lee, supra note 9, at 280; Rina Chandran,
Poverty Makes Surrogates of Indian Women in Gujarat, REUTERS, (Apr. 8, 2009, 12:47 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/08/us-india-surrogate-idUSBOM1574520090408.
268. See Ian Williams & Rory Kress, A Baby Made in India: A Couple’s Dream Comes
True, NBCNEWS.COM (May 28, 2012, 8:13 AM), http://todayhealth.today.msnbc.msn.com/
_news/2012/05/28/11883566-a-baby-made-in-india-a-couples-dream-comes-true?lite
(surrogates in India live in a hostel so that doctors can monitor their health and nutrition); see
also Pande, supra note 11, at 982.
269. See Alison Bailey, Reconceiving Surrogacy: Toward a Reproductive Justice
Account of Indian Surrogacy, 26 HYPATIA 715, 721 (2011).
270. See id.
271. See Pande, supra note 11, at 982.
272. See Scott Carney, Cash on Delivery, MOTHER JONES, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 68
(explaining that although C-sections are often considered riskier for the baby and
dramatically increase the woman’s risk of death during childbirth, they are generally used for
international surrogacy, perhaps because they are faster and less personal than vaginal
deliveries). Carney’s article is available electronically under the alternative title Inside
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course. This does not provide extra risk to the fetus and may indeed be preferred by
commissioning parents. However, C-sections may be more risky for the surrogates
and their nearly automatic use distinguishes the international system from the
domestic system, where there is no evidence that C-Sections are regularly
preferred.273 This factor again demonstrates the greater dehumanization and
medicalization of an intimate relationship that occurs in international surrogacy.
In addition, there are other indicators of the greater threat of commodification
that occurs in international surrogacy. Foreign surrogates are uniformly much
poorer and live very different lives than commissioning couples, exacerbating the
extent to which, “a rich woman pays a poorer one to carry her child.”274 Surrogates
may be allowed to see the baby, but they are quickly separated from the baby and
from the commissioning couple.275 This may seem useful to commissioning
couples, as they do not need to deal with messy emotions and relationships. The
greater medicalization and institutionalization of the process in international
surrogacy reflects a much narrower development of relationships and human
attachment than in domestic surrogacy.
On the whole, the conditions of surrogacy as described above are intentionally
more commercialized and less intimate. Surrogates are largely dehumanized, highly
controlled and monitored, and discouraged from having any intimate connections
with the fetus or commissioning couple. Suppression of intimacy, however, does
not make it disappear, as will be discussed further in the following Section.276
2. Detachment and Distance
As can be extracted from the conditions of international surrogacy described
above, the process of international surrogacy contains considerably more
detachment and distance between the surrogate and the commissioning couple than
is experienced in domestic systems of surrogacy. The detachment and distance
between the surrogate and the commissioning couple is more than just medical and
experiential post-birth; culturally and socio-economically, the commissioning
couple and the surrogate are strangers. Unlike in domestic surrogacy, relations
between commissioning parents and surrogate mothers are distant due to
geographic and cultural differences. Commissioning couples usually do not meet
the surrogate until after the child is born, and are completely uninvolved in her
medical care during pregnancy and with her recovery after the pregnancy.277 The
relationship is completely contractualized, not personal and intimate as in the
manner it develops in domestic surrogacy relationships. Commissioning couples
may prefer the detachment; it may seem as less of a headache and also less

India’s Rent-a-Womb Business, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/
02/surrogacy-tourism-india-nayna-patel.
273. Id.
274. SPAR, supra note 217, at 94.
275. See Pande, supra note 58, at 622; Pande, supra note 11, at 976 (“The surrogate is
expected to be a disciplined contract worker who will give the baby away immediately after
delivery without creating a fuss.”)
276. See infra notes 277–87 and accompanying text.
277. See Parks, supra note 86, at 333–34.
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complicated.278 In fact, many individuals who use international surrogacy say that
they prefer the more systematic, professional way that international surrogacy
works, in which the messy personal involvement is largely avoided.279
The question is whether and how such detachment is problematic. This distance
and detachment bend the mixed intimate and commercial nature of the relationship
discussed above towards being more commercial. Avoiding human relationships
thereby hides the intimacy involved in surrogacy, as the surrogate nurtures the
fetus, but does not get to know the commissioning family. As discussed above, the
intimacy involved in gestation fosters an emotional relationship with the
commissioning couple when they come into contact with one another. Moreover,
empirical studies demonstrate the surrogates benefit from the relationship with the
intended parents and are more content with the experience the better relations are
with the parents.280 International surrogacy essentially avoids this whole issue.
Some might argue that this is the more appropriate way for the relationships to
proceed.281 But, such avoidance is problematic. Many surrogates are likely to suffer
more from the process personally since surrogates attest to benefitting from the
relationships in domestic settings. Intimacy as an expression of the intimate work
the surrogate is performing is more constrained for a foreign surrogate.
Indeed, in a testimony to the need for intimacy, as well as the natural
development of intimacy between surrogates and intended parents, interviews with
surrogates in India demonstrate that foreign surrogates may crave that intimacy.
Many foreign surrogates emphasize their global sisterly ties with commissioning
couples, insisting that they will continue to stay in constant contact after the birth
and even that the intended parents were likely to pay for the surrogate’s children’s
educational expenses directly out of familial love.282 In interviews, some surrogates
contended that strict clinic guidelines insisting the baby be removed from the
surrogate immediately would not be enforced by commissioning couples.283 Some
of these surrogates went so far as pining for and imagining relationships with the
couple hiring them.284 They form imagined bonds with intended mothers, referred
to by some as “sisters” and predict a continued relationship with these women and
the children that they gestate once the children are born.285 Even when these
relationships cannot and do not exist, the need for these relationships is still
personified. Although such relationships may exist, it is almost never really the
case that they exist in the manner that the surrogates imagine them to be and
continuing such relationships is logistically very difficult given the cost and legal

278. See id. at 334 (referring to the preference that commissioning parents may have for a
surrogate who cannot bother them after the birth).
279. Rita Bakshi, India – a Suitable Destination of International Intended Parents, IVF
SURROGACY INDIA (May 10, 2012), http://ivfcentreindia.blogspot.com/2012/05/indiasuitable-destination-of.html.
280. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
281. See Case, supra note 130, at 1132–35.
282. See Pande, supra note 58, at 622.
283. Id. at 622.
284. Amrita Pande, “At Least I Am Not Sleeping with Anyone”: Resisting the Stigma of
Commercial Surrogacy in India, 36 FEMINIST STUD. 292, 306–07 (2010).
285. Id.; Pande, supra note 58, at 622.
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restrictions of traveling. Moreover, even foreign surrogates describe their activities
using concepts of “gifts,” if not to the intended couple, then for themselves due to
the money they are receiving, and consider intended parents their “global sisters.”
Like surrogates that live closer to the commissioning parents, foreign surrogates
transfer the intimacy of gestation to their perception of the nature of the surrogate
relationships.286 The intimacy is hidden and minimized in foreign surrogacy, but it
is still experienced. Foreign surrogates do not want to see themselves as
commodified, replaceable wombs, despite their treatment by the clinics.287
Gestation is intimate by its nature, and in order to avoid problematic levels of
commodification of vulnerable parties, it is important that such intimacy be given
an outlet alongside the contractual aspects of the agreement. The mixing of the
intimate and commercial in international surrogacy may play out differently and the
intimacy is more contained, but it exists regardless. The outlet for this intimacy
should not be just in the imagined or experienced worlds of the surrogate, but
recognized as a central part of the surrogacy relationship. International surrogacy
transactions do not and cannot legally reflect the intimate and commercial
complexity of surrogacy and therefore are more problematic. These transactions
have developed as distant and commercial in a way that domestic systems do not.
Surrogates cannot benefit with ongoing relationships with commissioning couples.
The way in which these arrangements devalue personhood by treating women as
incubators and not as ends in and of themselves is much more pronounced. This
can have both personal and societal effects. Thus, both on a consequentialist
empirical basis and an inherent deontological “commodification” basis,
international surrogacy is both different and more problematic.
3. Exploitation
Just as there is a greater threat of harm from commodification, there is also a
greater threat of exploitation and compromised autonomy of the surrogate. This is
for two overlapping reasons. First, the fee paid for surrogacy in the international
arena is quite high compared with other options afforded to women of the lower
classes who engage in these contracts.288 Apart from other problematic ways of
earning money, such as drugs or prostitution, there is no comparable way for
uneducated women in India to earn such large fees.289 The lack of choice facing

286. See Pande, supra note 58, at 624.
287. See Pande, supra note 11, at 986.
288. See Carney, supra note 272 (“In exchange for the inconvenience and physical
discomforts, [Indian surrogates] stand to receive a sum that’s quite substantial by their
meager standards . . . .”); Smerdon, supra note 252, at 54 (citing Outsourcing to Indian
Surrogate Mothers (CNN television broadcast Oct. 17, 2006), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0610/17/i_ins.01.html (“[T]o the extent that
people are looking to India because of the less expensive [surrogate] arrangement they can
make, if you do the math, [Indian surrogates are] making ten times their husband’s [income],
then that’s the equivalent of paying somebody [in the United States] probably $150,000 to
$200,000 for being a gestational surrogate.”)).
289. Ryznar, supra note 167, at 1018 n.61 (citing Krawiec, supra note 104, at 225–26)
(“Thirty-five percent of Indians live on less than one dollar per day, while a surrogate mother
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women is due to the greater socioeconomic disparities between rich and poor,
greater levels of poverty suffered, and diminished economic mobility.290 In this
economic climate, these decisions seem much more coercive and pressured than in
first world countries where women tend to have other choices to support
themselves.291 Studies of Indian surrogates, in contrast to the domestic studies
described above,292 demonstrate a very low level of education and economic
earning power.293 For many, surrogacy is their last resort for feeding and educating
existing children.294 The supply of surrogates is ample despite stigmatization of the
enterprise in Indian culture.295 Foreign surrogates themselves attest to this
economic compulsion caused by the poverty in which the live.296 Though they give
their consent in the liberal meaning, there is no doubt that these choices are made
under less than optimal conditions. In such contexts exploitation and compromised
autonomy are much greater threats.
Second, the status of women in the countries in which international surrogacy is
permitted is lower than in the countries of most commissioning couples.297 Men
may bear undue influence over their wives and female family members, pressuring
them to earn the money that surrogacy affords.298 The money earned is not
regularly held in women’s names due to patriarchal family structures.299 As
earns between six and ten thousand dollars”); see also Donchin, supra note 148, at 326
(“Poverty induces people to resort to work that separates them from their families or
jeopardizes their health.”); Pande, supra note 11, at 974 (“[M]oney earned through surrogacy
[is] equivalent to almost five years of total family income . . . .”).
290. See Ryznar, supra note 167, at 1018; see also Brugger, supra note 263, at 670–71 &
n.28 (citing Smerdon, supra note 252, at 54 (“Indian women may be pressured by their
families, brokers, and personal circumstances to lend their bodies for cash.”)); Donchin,
supra note 148, at 325–26.
291. Donchin, supra note 148, at 326; Ryznar, supra note 167, at 1017; SPAR, supra note
217, at 87.
292. SPAR, supra note 217, at 82; Pande, supra note 284, at 297 (finding that surrogate
education levels in India ranged from illiteracy to high school level, with the average being
middle school level); Pande, supra note 11, at 974 (same).
293. Pande, supra note 11, at 974 (stating the median family income of forty-two
surrogates she interviewed was $60 per month; thirty-four of forty-two were below the
official Indian poverty line).
294. Id. at 976.
295. Pande, supra note 284, at 293; Pande, supra note 11, at 975 (“The parallels between
commercial surrogacy and sex work in the Indian public imagination make surrogacy a
highly stigmatized labor option.”); Lee, supra note 9, at 280.
296. See Pande, supra note 10, at 988.
297. See generally Smerdon, supra note 252, at 53 (“Though the underlying technologies
are new, surrogacy perpetuates the legacy of reproductive oppression of poor Indian
women.”).
298. Ryznar, supra note 161, at 1029 (citing Sudha Ramachandran, India’s New
Outsourcing Business-Wombs, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (June 16, 2006), http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/South_Asia/HF16Df03.html; Sreeraman, India Urged to Regulate “Commercial
Surrogacy,” MEDINDIA (Dec. 12, 2009), http://medindia.net/news/India-Urged-to-RegulateCommercial-Surrogacy-62159-2.htm); see also Pande, supra note 271, at 303 (discussing the
way surrogates in India look at their actions as directed by the family, which is led by the
husband).
299. Ryznar, supra note 167, at 1029.
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women’s autonomy in general is much more compromised in these geographies,
one should be more wary of the freedom of contract attaching to women who
engage in these surrogate arrangements.300 As the nature of selling gestation
services is more complex than most other engagements, this compromised
autonomy should be taken seriously in considering whether these arrangements can
be freely and autonomously chosen.
4. Race
A racial or cultural hierarchy is also involved in international surrogate
motherhood that appears not to be regularly present in domestic surrogacy.301
Commissioning couples prefer genetic donors from similar racial and/or cultural
backgrounds, while they are comfortable using surrogates of different races or
cultures. While the United States is also a destination for gamete donations as well
as hiring surrogates, the cheaper cost and availability of women in third-world
countries is increasingly popular.302 These women are wanted for their gestational
abilities, not for their genetic contributions to procreation. In domestic surrogacy,
surrogates tend to be of similar cultural and racial backgrounds to commissioning
couples.303 International surrogates are usually different, darker, and less Western
than their commissioning couples.304
This hierarchy of race among those commissioning surrogates, egg donors, and
surrogates gestating children may be more troubling on commodification and
exploitation grounds. Such arrangements may seem more like buying lower class
women’s services as opposed to sharing a relationship with women who provide
intimate services for commissioning couples. Indeed, Lisa Ikemoto argues that the
act of hiring foreign, racially different surrogates is an act of hierarchy and
detachment: “What these stories express is the persistence of a form of racial
distancing that may make hiring a woman to gestate, give birth to, and give up a
child psychologically comfortable. It is a post-industrial form of master-servant
privilege.”305 Given the greater detachment and commercialization involved in
international surrogacy discussed above, we should be wary of avoiding difficult
emotional attachments in a potentially racial and hierarchical manner.
5. Concerns Regarding Nationality
Another difference between domestic and international surrogacy is that when a
commissioning couple uses a foreign surrogate, the commissioning couple may
experience significant hurdles in bringing the baby home and obtaining citizenship

300. See, e.g., Pande, supra note 284, at 303 (recounting interviews in which male family
members describe making decisions for female surrogates).
301. See infra notes 302–05 and accompanying text (noting that surrogates are often of
the same race as commissioning couples).
302. See, e.g., Ikemoto, supra note 131, at 285–87, 295.
303. Id. at 286.
304. See id. at 308.
305. Id.
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for the child.306 Different countries have a variety of rules regarding who is the
legal mother of a baby born through surrogacy.307 In fact, as I have argued above,
defining parenthood in the context of surrogacy and other Artificial Reproductive
Techniques (ART) is a complex and persistent dilemma with multiple answers and
is difficult to resolve within a jurisdiction, not to mention across a myriad of
jurisdictions worldwide. As citizenship or nationality is usually tied to parentage, if
a foreign jurisdiction refuses to recognize the commissioning couple as parents,
crises may ensue. For instance, in the English case of X & Y, the commissioning
couple was not considered the legal parents under English law; rather, in
accordance with British parentage statutes, the Ukrainian surrogate and her
husband would have to be considered the legal parents.308 In Ukraine, the
commissioning couple was considered to be the legal parents. Thus, it was not even
feasible to adopt the child, and the commissioning couple was not able to remain in
Ukraine. After a protracted legal struggle, the child was allowed to enter the United
Kingdom on a special decision in the interests of the child, despite legal rules to
facilitate his citizenship. Even if crises do not ensue, and ultimately the
commissioning couple finds solutions, the extra bureaucratic struggle and costs do
differentiate foreign from domestic arrangements.
Moreover, as the case above illustrates, if any dispute exists, the commissioning
couple and the baby may become separated by geography and travel visas. If the
commissioning couple separates and a custody battle ensues or they do not want the
baby, if the baby has serious disabilities, or if other legal problems arise, the
geographic distance between commissioning couple and child, as well as the
problems of nationality, can cause litigation and suffering.309 Indeed, in at least one
case, a child born to an Indian surrogate was left without parents or citizenship.310
These complications can make an already complex situation into a labyrinth.
In sum, on account of these differences, international surrogate motherhood
raises more concerns than domestic surrogacy. Simply put, the commercialization
has run rampant in international surrogacy without much regard for the intimacy

306. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 148, at 328.
307. See infra notes 308–10 and accompanying text; see also Donchin, supra note 148, at
328.
308. X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC (Fam) 3030, [5], [9]–[10] (Eng.)
(holding that under both English and Ukrainian law, the children were made both parentless
and stateless under the circumstances). However, the Court held that under the letter of the
law in England, the Ukrainian surrogate and her husband were the legal parents. Id. at [5]
(“It is clear (and accepted on all sides) that the effect of the provision is that in English law
the Ukrainian woman (although biologically unrelated to the twins) is for all purposes the
sole legal mother of these children. . . . It is common ground that the Ukrainian woman’s
husband acquiesced to the surrogacy and, if subsection (2) applies to him, he is in English
law the sole father (although again biologically unrelated) of these children.”)
309. See, e.g., KARI POINTS, THE KENAN INST. FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIV., COMMERCIAL
SURROGACY AND FERTILITY TOURISM IN INDIA: THE CASE OF BABY MANJI 5–7 (2009),
available at http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Case-Study-Surrogacy
.pdf (discussing how the commissioning couple divorced and then the father became
enmeshed in litigation in two legal systems in trying to transport the baby back to Japan,
which bans surrogacy, from India); Parks, supra note 86, at 333–34.
310. Parks, supra note 86, at 333–34.
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involved. Practically, foreign surrogates are detached and distant. Recognizing the
intimacy along with the financial transaction is more difficult. The emotional,
socioeconomic, and racial distance between commissioning couples and foreign
surrogates is much more pronounced. Both in the context of commodification and
exploitation, the problematic nature of international surrogacy makes its use
morally charged and unpalatable, particularly in comparison with domestic
surrogacy.
B. How Domestic Jurisdictions Should React to the More Problematic Nature of
International Surrogacy
Given the more problematic nature of international surrogacy evident in these
differences, the jurisdiction in which the intended parents reside and which will be
the country of residence of the baby born of international surrogacy are left to
contemplate how to respond. Ultimately, even appropriate regulation of domestic
surrogacy will not prevent people from using foreign surrogates. Moreover, if
domestic regulations are restrictive or supply does not meet demand, then domestic
citizens will be further incentivized to look abroad when hiring a surrogate.311
While many have recommended international regulation of international
surrogacy,312 and such regulation may indeed be appropriate, for various reasons it
has not occurred and is unlikely to occur anytime in the near future.313 Thus, it is
left for the local jurisdiction of the intended parents to consider how to respond to
international surrogacy if they want to disincentivize its use.314
On the one hand, it is cumbersome to try to affect foreign surrogate
arrangements. Moreover, since local jurisdictions do not have control over foreign
residents, it can be argued that it is an inappropriate infraction on sovereignty, even
if justifiable on ethical and regulatory grounds, to attempt to alter foreign citizens’
behaviors.315 For instance, even if a domestic jurisdiction disagrees with foreign

311. See Donchin, supra note 148, at 329.
312. See, e.g., Jennifer Rimm, Comment, Booming Baby Business: Regulating
Commercial Surrogacy in India, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1429, 1453–62 (2009).
313. See Brugger, supra note 263, at 681–87 (listing various reasons why international
regulation is unlikely, including widely differing views on the advisability of surrogacy at
all, the different areas of law such an agreement would impact, and conflicts with domestic
legal regimes, as well as problems of noncompliance).
314. For an interesting account of how criminalization of regulation of medical tourism
can be justified from a normative perspective, see Cohen, supra note 262, at 1384–85. Cohen
emphasizes that as foreign surrogates are citizens of a foreign jurisdiction, the domestic state
may not have an interest in regulating foreign surrogacy. In this Article, I assume that
regulation can be justified by a state’s interests in actions of the commissioning couple
participating in foreign surrogacy. In addition, a child born of foreign surrogacy will be
brought back to the domestic jurisdiction. Finally, a domestic system can have an interest in
the commodification and exploitation of foreign citizens.
315. See David J. Doorey, In Defense of Transnational Domestic Labor Regulation, 43
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 953 (2010) (discussing infringement on sovereignty arguments
against transnational laws); Emmanuelle Mazuyer, Labor Regulation in the North American
Free Trade Area: A Study on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 22
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 239, 258 (2001) (one country asserting its labor laws on other
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labor practices, which its own citizens benefit from in the form of cheaper labor
and products, states generally leave foreign countries to deal with protecting their
own citizens.316 One country may try to influence foreign governments to modify
their labor practices through political means, but domestic jurisdictions generally
will not pass regulations directed at the employers or prohibit trade in such
products.317
However, while foreign surrogacy progresses abroad, which is where the
contract is signed and the surrogate lives, the jurisdiction of the commissioning
couple does have some legal control over the process. Babies born of foreign
surrogacy arrangements are born in the foreign country, and commissioning parents
then seek travel documents to bring the baby back to the domestic jurisdiction.318
Moreover, commissioning couples must seek a legal determination from their home
countries that they are the legal parents of the baby.319 In order for international
surrogacy to work smoothly, domestic jurisdictions must at a minimum provide for
these legalities.320 Thus, the jurisdiction of the commissioning couple can choose to
criminalize the use of foreign surrogates for local citizens or to deny babies born of
surrogacy citizenship, thereby making the process largely untenable for local
citizens.
These options should be rejected. Criminalization or refusing citizenship is
extremely punitive and affects the children as much as the parents.321 Such
prohibitions or criminalization can serve to stigmatize children and punish innocent
children in a manner that fails to protect children’s civil rights.322 Moreover,
assuming that foreign surrogacy continues despite these regulations, it is very
problematic not to allow those children to be raised by their intended parents.
Refusal to let the child into the country seems particularly harsh when they were
created at the behest of local citizens. The burden on the foreign country also seems
unfair to that jurisdiction and overly punitive to the baby who may be a genetic
relation to the intended parents. While this can be said of international adoption as
well, children who are orphaned in foreign countries are still citizens of that
countries can raise significant concerns about infringing the other state’s sovereignty).
316. See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered
State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
401, 403–11 (2001); cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1531, 1578–80 (2002) (“Resistance to transnational legal authority,
endemic to American law, has insulated labor law from the potential influence of
international human rights or other labor rights such as those that have forced the
reexamination of national labor laws in Europe and elsewhere.”). I am not judging whether
one country should try to regulate a foreign jurisdiction’s labor practices or whether
international treaties should be enforced; I am only commenting on the customary practice of
leaving each country to create its own system of labor laws.
317. See infra notes 312–14 and accompanying text. But see Shima Baradaran &
Stephanie Barclay, Fair Trade and Child Labor, 43 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2011)
(advocating transnational regulation to prevent child labor); Doorey, supra note 315.
318. See Storrow, supra note 252, at 597–598.
319. See Smerdon, supra note 252, at 73–81.
320. Id.
321. Storrow, supra note 252, at 608 (discussing harms to children from delegitimizing
surrogacy).
322. See id.

2013]

MOTHERING FOR MONEY

1277

country and clearly the responsibility of that country. Moreover, it is possible that
not all foreign jurisdictions practice surrogacy in a manner that implicates
problematic levels of commodification or exacerbates exploitation concerns. Thus,
criminalization may not be appropriate.
There are other more intermediate options short of criminalization and
prohibition that could be considered by jurisdictions trying to avoid their citizens’
use of foreign surrogates, given the more problematic nature of international
surrogacy. I explore a few possibilities, which are not intended to be exhaustive.
Given the more ethically and legally problematic nature of foreign surrogate
motherhood as described above, local jurisdictions may attempt to find ways to
encourage the use of domestic surrogacy short of outlawing foreign surrogacy.
Domestic jurisdictions should take into account that domestic surrogacy is
preferable on many accounts than foreign surrogacy. Therefore, domestic
jurisdictions should work to ensure that the domestic system is accessible.323 In
addition, instead of criminalizing foreign surrogacy or refusing to grant the baby
born of foreign surrogacy citizenship in the local jurisdiction, domestic
jurisdictions could fine commissioning families monetarily for using foreign
surrogates that are not otherwise approved through the system of accreditation
suggested below.324 This would have the likely effect of disincentivizing foreign
surrogacy and equalizing the costs of domestic and foreign surrogacy depending on
the amount of the fine imposed. Thus, commissioning couples would have less of
an incentive to use foreign surrogates and would hopefully instead use a domestic
surrogate under a framework that is less ethically and legally problematic.
Moreover, similar to the way the United States tries to influence foreign labor
laws, there are “soft law” regulations that use carrot-and-stick policies in the
context of trade with foreign governments to incentivize them to improve
conditions in their own countries.325 While international surrogacy is unlikely to
attract sufficient attention from the general public to influence overall trade policies
with foreign countries, spreading influence in this context through trade agreements
has been suggested.326
Comparable to the manner in which international adoption is regulated in the
United States for those countries that are signatories to the Hague Convention,327 a
certification system can be made for surrogacy agencies abroad as they are for
international adoption agencies.328 When significant problems are found in foreign

323. Cf. Donchin, supra note 148, at 331 (suggesting but rejecting the possibility that
domestic jurisdictions provide a more liberal system of gamete and surrogacy transactions in
order to disincentivize people from using the more ethically problematic system of
international surrogacy).
324. See infra notes 327–331 and accompanying text.
325. See Doorey, supra note 315, at 953; Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Conditioning Trade on
Foreign Labor Law: The U.S. Approach, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J. 253, 253–54 (1988).
326. See Donchin, supra note 148, at 331.
327. The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134. The Intercountry Adoption Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-279, 114 Stat. 825 (2000), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–54 (2006),
is the implementing legislation for the Convention.
328. See 42 U.S.C. § 14921(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this
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country adoption, the United States has prevented international adoptions in those
countries.329 In the context of international surrogacy as well, domestic jurisdictions
can certify certain countries for surrogacy while disincentivizing international
surrogacy from other countries.330 This would allow foreign jurisdictions to meet a
domestic jurisdiction’s determination of minimally acceptable protections and
procedures in a manner comparable to international adoption.331 It would
incentivize foreign jurisdictions to meet those standards. This would allow
domestic jurisdictions to certify foreign surrogacy destinations on a case-by-case
basis depending on the protections in place in those countries.332 Finally, if
international law were to regulate surrogacy, a local jurisdiction could sign on to
such a convention.333
In the end, it is important to recognize the differences between domestic and
international surrogacy. Regulators of domestic surrogacy and foreign policy
makers should deliberate on how to treat international surrogacy in light of the
problematic conditions involved.
CONCLUSION
The benefits to surrogacy are real. History and empirical studies demonstrate the
benefits, as do the thousands of personal success stories. Litigation is rare and
general satisfaction is high among both commissioning parents and surrogates.
subchapter, no person may offer or provide adoption services in connection with a
Convention adoption in the United States unless that person (1) is accredited or approved in
accordance with this subchapter; or (2) is providing such services through or under the
supervision and responsibility of an accredited agency or approved person.”); see also Ann
Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The Hague Children’s Conventions and the Case for
International Family Law in the United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47, 85–91 (2010) (describing
the accreditation process for intercountry adoption agencies and how accreditation helps to
prevent abuses); International Adoption Becoming Difficult Amid Treaties, Regulation (PBS
NewsHour
television
broadcast
July
1,
2008),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/social_issues/july-dec08/adoptionabroad_07-01.html
(discussing stringent adoption regulations that have been implemented by international
organizations and foreign countries).
329. See Estin, supra note 328, at 86–87 & nn.219–20 (citing Sara Corbett, Where Do
Babies Come From?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 16, 2002, at 42; Elissa Gootman, Investigation
by I.N.S. Delays Obtaining Visas and Snarls Adoptions in Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2002, at B5 (describing a couple’s heartbreak and anger with their failed attempt to adopt a
Vietnamese child); Seth Mydans, U.S. Interrupts Cambodian Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 2001, at A7; Elizabeth Olson, Families Adopting in Vietnam Say They Are Caught in
Diplomatic Jam, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at A14; U.S. Embassy Report Faults Vietnam’s
Oversight of Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at A7).
330. See, e.g., Donchin, supra note 148, at 330–31.
331. See, e.g., Iris Leibowitz-Dori, Womb for Rent: The Future of International Trade in
Surrogacy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329, 353 (1997) (proposing that surrogacy be
regulated similar to international adoption in which member countries have to follow certain
guidelines before adoptions with the country are recognized).
332. Cf. I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1467, 1515–23 (2010) (arguing for a
certification process with regards to medical tourism more generally).
333. See supra notes 329–30 and accompanying text.

2013]

MOTHERING FOR MONEY

1279

Surrogacy should therefore not be prohibited or suppressed. But, the ongoing
concerns about surrogacy are also real. Surrogates engage in a delicate bargain:
selling their bodily capacities and gestating a baby on someone else’s behalf. Their
bodies are not entirely their own, and the relationships they develop with
commissioning couples are significant. This intimate bargain creates real fears of
potential exploitation and commodification of women’s bodies. Surrogates are
vulnerable to these bargains at the same time that they benefit from them.
The suggested regulations consider different protections for the surrogates,
whom I identify as the vulnerable parties. We should care about the vulnerabilities
of surrogates and their human dignity as well as the effects of commodification on
society for ethical and practical reasons. A system of surrogacy that takes seriously
real relationships will avoid conflict and treat people providing useful services
appropriately and with dignity. While such protections can in theory be waived or
go unenforced, the regulation will recognize not only the transaction but the
relationships that develop, raising the status of the surrogates and their work. Such
efforts to improve the status of surrogates and to better reflect the relationships
involved in commercial intimacy are comparable to efforts to create a more kin-like
legal framework for parenthood that better reflects the reality of the way children
are both created and cared for.
Given the need to recognize the intimacy while reaping the benefits of
commerciality in the prescriptive framework for regulating commercial intimacy I
develop, the move from surrogates who are hired locally, or at least within the
same country as the commissioning couple, to those living abroad is significant.
Due to the distinct differences between domestic and international surrogacy, the
balance that I argue can be achieved in domestic surrogacy between stimulating
markets and recognizing intimacy cannot be obtained in international surrogacy.
The intimacy is lost in the geographical and cultural distance. Thus, international
surrogacy is not just another form of the same surrogate process; it is constitutively
different and morally and practically more problematic. To the extent possible, it
should be avoided, and governmental policy should reflect this hierarchy.

